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This examination of Stevens' "Notes Toward a Supreme 
Fiction" will engage contemporary and postmodern positions 
toward Stevens' "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction," and will 
also investigate the current state of Stevens criticism. 
The thesis follows various strains of postmodern critique 
as far as they apply to "Notes," before moving on to a 
methodology more aptly suited to the structure and style 
of this poem. That methodology will be phenomenological, 
on the model of Merleau-Ponty, Derrida and later Heidegger. 
While phenomenology and deconstruction both break down 
the clear distinction between conceiving subject and 
perceived object, Merleau-Ponty and Stevens proceed to 
explore the phenomenon of preobjective experience. Stevens* 
"Notes" catches the disclosure or referential arising of 
perceptual and linguistic meaning and discloses this process 
of disclosing. The analysis offered in this thesis applies 
a phenomenology of perception and meaning to "Notes," and 
calls upon Merleau-Ponty's work for explication. These 
essays offer a phenomenological poetics and propose that 
Merleau-Ponty*s thought remains amenable to the Heideggerian 
"deep-structure" called en-owning. This takes an analysis 
of "Notes*' to the deep-structural level of language detailed 
in competing accounts by Derrida and Heidegger. Stevens' 
poem addresses this deep structure, revealing the process 
of making sense from non-sense. The way we make sense 
of the world serves as the implicit subject of the poem 
and guides the poem's style and content. The poem also 
comments upon and celebrates the power of poetry to reveal 
the process of revealing. 
This study concludes that "Notes" reveals the idiom 
appropriate to sense-making without naming and limiting 
it. This idiom reveals necessarily incomplete contexts 
that, despite their incompleteness, resonate for a time 
among themselves and other such contexts to give a familiar 
world without self-present, stabilizing identities. 
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Introduction 
"The poem refreshes life so that we share. 
For a moment, the first idea." Wallace Stevens, "Notes 
Toward a Supreme Fiction" 
"When the voice of the god or the poet is missing, 
one must be satisfied with the vicars of speech that 
are the cry and writing." Jacques Derrida, Edmund 
Jabes and the Question of the Book 73. 
"The nature of art is poetry. The nature of poetry, 
in turn, is the founding of truth. We understand 
founding here in a triple sense; founding as bestowing, 
founding as grounding, and founding as beginning." 
Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought 75. 
Late twentieth century Western philosophy finds itself 
obsessed with leveling previous sources of authority, 
values, and meaning in all human affairs. And this leveling 
is no mere iconoclasm. When Nietzsche decides to 
philosophize "with a hammer," and undermines Western notions 
of an extra-worldly source of meaning, he still takes 
as given the autonomy and authority of the individual who 
posits meaning and values. One hundred years later, 
however, even the notion of a meaning-giving self gets 
pulled into differance, the play of shifting interpretations 
that gives minimal sense to the world while destabilizing 
meaning and authority. 
In this thoroughgoing destabilization, postmodernism 
and technological nihilism share the same project: both 
of these undermining forces manifest themselves in a 
stylistic tendency to acquire ever-increasing amounts of 
flexibility, to grow ever more cynical vis-a-vis authority 
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and to level meaningful differences by rendering everything 
equidistant. The postmodern emphasis on play tends, 
generally speaking, to trivialize, aestheticize and 
challenge political commitments. 
At the same time that Western thinking strives to 
annihilate all grounds, however, a concern for "healing" 
grows. Western humankind looks at the environment, at 
gender relations, at family situations and at technology 
and finds that Enlightenment-era notions of the mind-body 
dualism and anthropocentrism have led to unprecedented 
destruction and that this domination-oriented paradigm 
must be replaced. People involved with "deep ecology," 
and with healing the rifts in human relations, stress human 
receptivity to the profound mystery of nature and of life. 
So postmodern. Western life, by turns, seems rife with 
possibilities, challenges and freedom on the one hand, 
and alarm and claustrophobic anxiety on the other. And 
the two predominant tendencies in contemporary thinking 
— leveling and healing — put thinking about practices 
in a quandary: seeing possibilities for change everywhere, 
but lacking any criteria by which to choose, we implicitly 
wonder, "which will prevail, complete nihilism or the 
healing power?" 
But perhaps this is the wrong question. What if it 
turns out that the annihilation of all ground and the 
healing power both grow from the same source? This 
possibility makes the contemporary Western condition more 
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complicated, but also more interesting. In some ways, 
what Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, and Stevens might call poetic 
thinking is also the source of the annihilation of all 
metaphysical ground. But, for Stevens and Merleau-Ponty, 
poetry provides not only the deconstruction of Western 
metaphysics — especially of logical, prepositional modes 
of thought — it also gives the condition for the 
reconstruction of a meaningful relation between humanity 
and the mysterious process that lets certain commitments 
matter and others seem trivial. 
In phenomenological accounts of poetry, the poet 
re-gestalts previous ways of speaking about and 
understanding the world so that speakers may speak anew, 
finding new relations between things and seeing new orders 
emerge from the ruins of the old. The poet destabilizes 
or deconstructs the background understanding of what it 
means to be, so that the poem may found a new site. On 
this new site, the poet offers a new interpretation of 
the being of everything, and this interpretation gathers 
manifold practices and ways of speaking into itself. This 
poetic process of rebuilding is what Heidegger calls "the 
setting-into-work of truth" (PLT 75). As he says, "the 
setting-into-work of truth thrusts up the unfamiliar and 
extraordinary and at the same time thrusts down the ordinary 
and what we believe to be such" (Ibid.). Once the poet 
has thrust down previous meanings, senses of the world 
and understandings of the ordinary, the poet's task becomes 
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one of establishing and making familiar a new sense of 
life. 
To the end of offering a new understanding of what 
it means for anything to be, poetic thinking levels previous 
understandings of reality. But, having done this leveling, 
poetic thinking need not necessarily rebuild. The impulse 
toward healing and toward the reconstruction of sense is 
not the only impulse that presents itself to poetic 
thinking. Once one has problematized previous senses of 
the ordinary and of authority, one may continue to thrust 
up the unfamiliar and thrust down all possible sources 
of authority indefinitely. In this case, thinking takes 
its directive from the poetic urge to level meaningful 
differences and to remove the distinction between the near 
and the far, or the important and the trivial. Postmodern 
thought and practice is this "poetic urge" run riot, taken 
to the extent that the compulsion toward leveling precludes 
any authority at all. 
Heidegger names this strange postmodern calling "the 
malice of rage" against all authority, both present and 
possible (LH 267). He also finds that — through this 
strange calling, which is the calling to make commitment 
seem strange — technological thinking comes into its own, 
rendering everything and every one standing reserve, ready 
for new uses at a moment's notice. 
Both "the malice of rage" and the healing power spring 
from poetic thought. The poet, if a poet of the first 
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order, can rid readers of old notions of meaning and show 
the mysterious gathering process that gives meaning. And 
if readers become aware of this process, no one 
understanding of reality, be it the Enlightenment 
understanding or the technological understanding, will 
hold sway over them. 
Usually, Heidegger is understood as a nostalgic thinker. 
When Heidegger speaks of the history of being in the West, 
he does indeed tend to bemoan the absence of gods and the 
character of our Western "destiny," our changing but 
long-term cultural identities. But there is another, lesser 
known, tendency in Heidegger's thought. Toward the end 
of his life, Heidegger holds two conflicting views toward 
the issues of identity and difference. The "nostalgic" 
Heidegger invokes a new god to hold sway over Western human 
being and to give this way of being one unified style. 
But the non-metaphysical Heidegger, the Heidegger of 
"Building, Dwelling, Thinking," "The Thing," Gelassenheit, 
"The Way to Language," and "Time and Being" appreciates 
that all speaking, along with our ability to speak in terms 
of Being and presence, is grounded in the deeper, 
pre-metaphysical tendency in language that he calls 
Ereignis. The "gathering" of Ereignis lets meaning arise 
and gives human beings a maximal grip on percepts and 
situations, without revealing full contexts or fully present 
entities. 
Stevens shows the complex and mysterious way in which 
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meaning arises while he too avoids speaking in terms of 
identity and presence. And in so doing Stevens restores 
a sense of the authority and mystery to this process without 
suggesting a content to or a definitive name for this 
authority. 
Stevens discusses the various tasks that the poem 
engages. The poem "sings jubilas," and it gives expression 
to religious sensibilities. But, more difficult and 
important than either of these projects is the poem's role 
of showing the non-objectifiable process of the arising 
of meaning. The poem shows the mysterious tendency in 
human practices to focus and to deepen the relevance of 
percepts and words, in short the poem reveals the tendency 
to make sense from non-sense. 
I; "A Seeing and Unseeing in the Eye" 
"But the difficultest rigor is forthwith. 
On the image of what we see, to catch from that 
Irrational moment its unreasoning, 
As when the sun comes rising, when the sea 
Clears deeply, when the moon hangs on the wall 
Of heaven-haven. These are not things transformed. 
Yet we are shaken by them as if they were. 
We reason about them with a later reason." 
(CP 398) 
"Unreasoning," as it appears in the "It Must Give 
Pleasure" section of Stevens' "Notes toward a Supreme 
Fiction," is not non-sense. The poem, though it does not 
reason by propositions, nonetheless moves, like a melody, 
by a logic of its own. Since prepositional logic serves 
as an instrument by which readers reflect upon experience 
and generally "reason about [experience] with a later 
reason," the so-called logic of these lines seems unusual 
enough in its earliness or its primacy to merit being called 
a prereflective logic, or simply a pre-logic. Yet, 
notwithstanding its pre-logical status, the momentum of 
the above cited lines still obeys a limited teleo-logic. 
And the telos that unfolds in these lines functions as 
a synechdoche for the type of directed-ness toward 
context-formation that emerges in "Notes" taken at large. 
Although the pre-reflective moment that the poet aims 
"to catch" will not render itself apprehensible in the 
ordinary terms of a logical context, contexts that enable 
minimal intelligibility do ari^e within and hold sway over 
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the poem. Further, the poem teaches its readers how to 
approach the prereflective process it reveals and it hints 
that this process may itself emerge under the proper kind 
of scrutiny. 
Given the setting in which it appears above, the 
infinitive "to catch" means: to allow a previously neglected 
phenomenon to come into its own. This phenomenon is also 
our own: the phenomenon under consideration is not itself 
an entity, but rather the process through which entities 
come to arise to perception. And it is the moment that 
objects arise to perception and the organizing activity 
which governs this arising that Stevens tries to "catch" 
and to reveal in the above lines and throughout "Notes." 
The poet's sense of the verb to catch is also familiar 
to at least one strain of phenomenology. Of Merleau-Ponty, 
H.L. Dreyfus tells us, he sought to catch disclosure, or 
"to produce an original and complex analysis of the source 
and status of order in the perceptual world" (SN x). And 
Merleau-Ponty's "difficultest" task was to produce an 
"ontology of sense" (xiii). 
Readers of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception 
and the later works which develop his phenomenology are 
brought to apprehend, or better, to sense, that all 
experience — be it perceptual or conceptual -- "is never 
totally without meaning [while its] meaning is never 
definitive" (ibid.). In order to give meaning, the 
prereflective organizing activity of perception requires 
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that the field it reveals remains referential, ambiguous 
and incomplete. And, since perception functions as the 
"unreasoning" condition of reason, so objectivity and 
notions of final "Truth" seem ultimately to devolve upon 
unreason and embodied, perspectival perception. 
Stevens talks about "thought/ Beating in the heart" 
(CP 382), and man, he tells his readers, is an "abstraction 
blooded" (385). This kind of thinking brings Steves close 
to Merleau-Ponty, for whom thinking is always already 
"blooded": embodied and embedded in a historical situation. 
And, for this reason, reason and vision, "reason's 
click-clack, its applied/ Enflashings" remain unable to 
get clear of, and clear about, facticity. 
While phenomenology surrenders the "philosophical" 
notion of non-referential "Truth," what might be called 
Stevens' phenomenological poetics desists in the pursuit 
of "Beauty" in order to catch the pre-rational, "un­
reasoning" movement that allows an image to present itself 
to perception. Stevens' "Notes" pursues this "[iIrrational 
moment" in which meaning appears in perception, and the 
poet of "Notes" implies that there exists no higher goal 
for contemporary art than to examine the process of making 
sense from non-sense. 
Before engaging the question of language, Merleau-Ponty 
examines perception, and one should follow Merleau-Ponty 
in considering the condition of perception before moving 
on to look at language. Like Stevens, Merleau-Ponty 
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concerns himself with the way that "perception hides its 
activity of organization and leads us to see objects as 
independent entities" (SN xiii). The organizing activity 
of perception also remains hidden because of its 
pervasiveness, its familiarity and because there is nothing 
with which to contrast it. Both Stevens and Merleau-Ponty 
try to catch this perceptual activity that most often goes 
unnoticed. By showing the moment or movement of 
sense-making, Stevens and Merleau-Ponty, each in his own 
way, brings to light the always already dimly-grasped 
awareness of the contingent and referential character of 
perception. 
To show the movement of sense-making, the process 
whereby the visible percept makes its appearance to the 
perceiver and elicites some particular comportment out 
of this perceiver, Stevens must speak about the background 
of sense that disappears so that objects may appear. Things 
appear to vision under aspects or, otherwise stated, in 
an indexical relation to the body's prior and on-going 
commitments in the world. The ordering activity of 
perception gives visible objects on the basis of the body's 
background, and language gives words in terms of the 
background. Wittgenstein calls this background a set of 
"agreements in our form of life" (PI 242). The background 
cannot be seen, but Stevens gets at it in those passages 
in which he gives readers a sense of perception that 
confuses vision and the invisible condition of visibility: 
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"It must be visible or invisible. 
Invisible or visible or both: 
A seeing and unseeing in the eye" (385). 
"The vivid transparence that you bring is peace" (380). 
Stevens is interested in both reaon and "unreasoning," 
seeing and "unseeing" and vividness and the transparence 
in which things come to appear. This "transparence," 
Merleau-Ponty will show, is the embodied background of 
one's practices, the body's innate and enculturated 
perceptual activity and one's style. 
Merleau-Ponty approaches perception by noting that 
those who ask how consciousness can give meaning to a world 
comprised of meaningless sense-data are asking the wrong 
set of questions. And Stevens would agree, judging by 
the poetic statement that when we reason with later reason, 
"we make of what we see, what we see clearly/ And have 
seen, a place dependent on ourselves" (401). Only when 
perceivers deliberate about the perceived, as it were, 
after the spontaneous perception, only then does the world 
appear as dependent upon our rational activity. There is 
no intentionality or meaning-imposition in ordinary 
perception for either Stevens or Merleau-Ponty. It is 
only when perception breaks down or perceivers try to 
understand it critically that meaning seems "dependent 
upon ourselves." 
In his Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty 
challenges traditional ways of thinking about perception 
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by asserting and demonstrating the fact that perceivers 
never primarily experience raw or uninterpreted sense-data. 
In traditional accounts of perception, which culminate 
in the early work of Husserl, such brute, unorganized 
"hyletic" data present themselves to intentional processes 
which, by way of a secondary operation, then organize the 
data into meaningful patterns. This view enjoys more 
prevalence now than ever. But such a view, Merleau-Ponty 
argues, is fundamentally flawed because it applies objective 
categories of thought to the preobjective field of 
experience upon which objectivity depends. 
For Merleau-Ponty, it turns out that our bodies 
organize experience prior to and usually without the aid 
of any cognitive processes at all. The body "takes a stand" 
(PP 274) toward the world from within the world, 
incorporating its skills, along with its biologically 
and socially conditioned perceptual capacities, and from 
this stance can, as Stevens asserts, "discover not impose" 
(CP 403) meaning. Against a background of past experiences 
and future projects, the body, which is neither subject 
nor object, opens up a field of experience and minimally 
organizes it before any reflection occurs. Merleau-Ponty 
compares this preobjective background of experience to 
the lighting in a room which makes directedness towards 
objects possible but is not itself an object towards which 
perception can be directed. 
Here a metaphor might bring some clarity to the notion 
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of the background and the perceptual field; in order to 
perceive any figure whatsoever, it must appear against 
a background. Unless itself foregrounded, this ground 
cannot be noticed; it disappears so that figures may appear. 
What we as perceivers forget, though, is that this 
background is implied in the appearance of every perceptible 
entity. As Dreyfus comments: "the figure can be said to 
have meaning since...it refers beyond what is immediately 
given" (SN xi). Merleau-Ponty also calls this background 
"the atmosphere of our present." (PP 442). Against the 
background of past experience and future projects, the 
body pre-cognitively orders experience. We perceive objects 
because we embody our perceptual background and thus 
encounter entities against this background. 
The organizing activity of perception opens up a field 
in which objects make sense. Perception also gives objects 
a constancy that they do not objectively show. For example, 
distant objects appear larger, and close objects smaller, 
than they would in a picture or a film. Perception also 
gives color and brightness constancy to objects before 
any thought about them occurs. Merleau-Ponty gives an 
example of a white patch against a background to elucidate 
the point that perception always gives perceivers more 
information than they could objectively know. Experiencing 
a white patch, perception organizes the experience of the 
whole and "runs on ahead of itself." (PP 390) Taking figure 
and ground into account, pre-reflective ordering casts 
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the patch into the foreground and arranges it into a unified 
whole, while giving the background as continuous. This 
pre-rational ordering gives the perceiver more than is 
objectively there in the figure-ground gestalt and makes 
order out of and against the always encroaching disorder 
that threatens sense. 
The organizing activity of perception also gives much 
more than falls on the surface of the viewer's retina. 
The field seems to run on behind the white patch, though 
there is no evidence that it actually does, and the patch 
itself seems to pull itself together against this ground. 
So the embodied perceptual process refers experiences 
to other experiences, organizes itself and the entities 
that show up against it and gives more than is objectively 
present. But, unlike the above mentioned background, our 
background, since it is embodied and all pervasive, can 
only be sensed, not represented. This background and the 
perceptual field that it discloses, like the body, is 
neither subjective nor objective — it is neither 
intentional nor is it comprised of a set of facts — but 
it exists prior to and contains both subjective and 
objective poles and makes their relation possible. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that this background is correlated 
with our bodily skill, and since our bodies themselves 
organize experience, and it is from within the world that 
we perceive, "our experience is always perspectival, i.e. 
incomplete" (SN xiii). 
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For Merleau-Ponty, both empiricist and intellectualist 
traditions, following Hume and Kant respectively, fail 
to take the unreasoning or prereflective character of 
perception into account: 
"[b]oth take the objective world as the object of 
their analysis, when this comes first neither in time 
nor meaning; and both are incapable of expressing the 
peculiar way in which perceptual consciousness 
constitutes its object" (PP 26). 
One cannot derive one's understanding of perception 
from one's knowledge of how things are. We comport 
ourselves in the world through a know-how, not through 
a knowledge of fact. No amount of knowledge, for example, 
that the moon is the same size on the horizon as it is 
at the zenith can make it not appear smaller at the zenith -
than it does on the horizon. Perception is predominantly 
passive and corrects itself through recourse to objective 
knowledge in cases of confusion. 
Traditional theorizing about perception covers over 
the phenomenon of the perceived world because it understands 
unreason with a later reason; the tradition reads reason 
in to perception prematurely. For Merleau-Ponty, "the 
world as perceived does not show the kind of definiteness 
and determinacy as the world as conceived of by the 
judgments of common sense and science" (SN xx). Traditional 
accounts of perception are misguided because they read 
detached, theoretical conceptions of the world that come 
from leaving out accounts of embodiment, back into finite, 
embodied perception. 
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But, not only is ambiguity a fact about sense-making, 
ambiguity is in fact necessary to perception. If all being, 
objective and human, were given in completely self-present, 
definite form, perception would collapse completely, or 
"lock into" each percept, and, finding nothing abstractible 
and generalizable from its object, perception would 
break-down, as it does in cases of impaired brain activity, 
finding no similarities and hence unable to move between 
one percept and the next. 
Here one might read Stevens' "later reason" for 
Merleau-Ponty's "objective world" and "unreasoning" for 
"perceptual activity." By "catch," for now obvious reasons, 
we cannot mean that Stevens re-presents perception's 
activity of organization. Rather, Stevens uses the 
infinitive "to catch" not in lexical terms of definition, 
but in idiomatic terms, as one says "to catch someone's 
meaning." Stevens' readers might also think of catching 
as Wittgenstein thinks of it when he says that when one 
catches a meaning, one catches an entire pattern, and "light 
dawns gradually over the whole" (OC 92). 
But, light dawns slowly, if at all, over the process 
whereby perception organizes experience, because perception, 
against overwhelming odds, works to give us a world 
characterized by solidity and determinacy. In working 
so well, perception leads us to forget its structurally 
necessary indeterminacy. 
It is to the perceptual process and its necessary 
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ambiguity that Stevens directs our attention. Where poets 
of ages prior to our own have, very generally speaking, 
subsumed analyses of the perceptual process under the desire 
to limn the thing perceived, Stevens shows his readers 
that to render great people and entities through mimesis, 
to speak for the masses, to praise a god and/or to exalt 
the human(-ist) spirit can no longer remain the goal of 
art. Commencing the section entitled "It Must Give 
Pleasure," and immediately prior to the lines that deal 
with "unreason," the poet prescribes an alternative place 
for poetry: 
"To sing jubilas at exact, accustomed times. 
To be crested and wear the mane of a multitude 
And so, as part, to exult with its great throat. 
To speak of joy and to sing of it, borne on 
The shoulders of joyous men, to feel the heart 
That is the common, the bravest fundament. 
This is a facile exercise...." (CP 398) 
Certainly, other poets focus their attention on 
perception, but, for Stevens the object of poetic scrutiny 
serves as a means to the ends of his phenomenology. Poetry 
no longer serves rhetorical or ritual ends; neither does 
it imitate actions of great men nor seek out the primordial 
language of nature. Poetry descends from the "shoulders 
of joyous men." But, if the poem brings us no nearer to 
the vulgate of experience, or to the vernacular, a la 
Wordsworth, and if it brings us no nearer to the natural 
world, in a similar Romantic vein, then apparently it must 
lift us up in apotheosis. But the poet closes off this 
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alternative almost before readers have recourse to it: 
"...Jerome 
Begat the tubas and the fire-wind strings. 
The golden fingers picking dark-blue air: 
For companies of voices moving there, 
To find of sound the bleakest ancestor. 
To find of light a music issuing 
Whereon it falls in more than sensual mode." (Ibid.) 
In these three stanzas, the last line of which begins 
the "difficultest rigor" stanzas, the poet alludes to St. 
Jerome and his preparation of the vulgate version of the 
Bible. This assumption helps explain the mock-biblical 
juxtaposition of "Begat" with tubas, and it leads readers 
on a geneological voyage, through choirs of voices, back 
to our "bleakest ancestor." But, such a geneology, if 
less facile than the poet's previous avocation, remains 
fruitless; readers find themselves cut-off from any 
pre-linguistic origins that the poet could translate into 
the vernacular. 
To further illustrate the futility of a return to 
origins and the futility of what Gerald Bruns, in his Modern 
Poetry and the Idea of Language, calls the "Orphic" 
understanding of poetry as revelation, the poet's use of 
the word "irrational" in stanza six will remind readers 
of the etymology of the word "rational." The rational, 
as nominative, is also the name for the Hebrew "hoshen," 
which becomes the Greek "logeion": an instrument used to 
translate the message of the oracle. The rational text 
and the text of the "rational" provides a "laying open" 
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or a "legein" of the oracle. For Stevens, poetry is 
irrational, it is no longer a translation of the "logos." 
"Difficulter" than any of the aforesaid artistic 
enterprises, mimetic and what Hillis Miller calls "aletheic" 
is the task of showing and saying the strangeness of our 
everyday, taken-for-granted experience of order. What 
the poet wants us to see, the object of the sentence that 
begins with "But," is the "unreasoning" organizing activity 
that governs our ability to perceive any image at all. 
Perception occurs before reason and obeys its own laws, 
and this process allows us to perceive the sun "rising" 
the ocean "clearing" and the moon "hanging." Objectively 
speaking, the sun does not rise the sea does not clear, 
and the moon does not hang. But, perception always gives 
objects as pre-interpreted, that is, already under some 
aspect and colored by the background against which they 
appear. If a context is binding, it gives a "Candid kind 
to everything" (CP 382). 
Merleau-Ponty calls the ways in which aspects of the 
perceptual field relate to one another "motivation." The 
appearance of interposed objects "motivates" the appearance 
of other objects and the appearance of distance. Again, 
what is important to notice here is the non-cognitive 
element of perception. Objects just appear already 
organized under aspects. Stevens points out this 
unreasoning activity of the body, showing readers that 
every appearance is always already metaphorical in the 
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sense that every appearance qua appearance points beyond 
itself. 
Stevens makes us aware of the inherent metaphoricity 
of perception. As readers progress from sun to sea to 
moon, the images the poet uses become less and less familiar 
to us until "Heaven-haven" forcefully indicates that all 
our ways of perceiving are metaphorical, that is interpreted 
in light of other experiences before they can be reasoned 
about. We perceive first, and we re-present and talk about 
images afterward. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, the task of any examination 
of perception should no longer involve offering a theory 
of how one gets from raw sense data to a refined 
consciousness of the objective world. Rather, the world 
is given in the sense that there is always some minimal 
organization among things in experience, some relationship 
between them, that does not depend upon the mind. It is 
this prereflective experience that Merleau-Ponty tries 
to recapture. As Merleau-Ponty says, he wants "to 
rediscover a commerce with the world and a presence to 
the world that is older than intelligence" (SN pro.). 
Merleau-Ponty and Stevens both dissolve the famed 
subject-object relation, showing the primordial perceptual 
world and the way that objects appear to perception before 
the mind makes any judgments about them. It is not the 
way that the mind and world relate, but what experience 
is like before they separate, that interests both 
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Merleau-Ponty and Stevens. "Notes," in fact, abounds in 
such meditations on the preobjective perceptual realm, 
and even begins the poem by returning to the preobjective 
moment: 
"Begin, ephebe, by perceiving the idea 
Of this invention, this invented world. 
The inconceivable idea of the sun. 
You must become an ignorant man again 
And see the sun again with an ignorant eye 
And see it clearly in the idea of it 
Never suppose an inventing mind as source 
Of this idea nor for that mind compose 
A voluminous master folded in his fire" (CP 380-81). 
The poet begins by inviting the initiate to perceive 
an idea. One could take this to mean, in the Platonic 
tradition, that the "idea of the sun" precedes any 
manifestation of the idea in physical form. On the 
traditional model, conceptualization precedes execution, 
the eidos, or fore-given representation given in the mind 
precedes production of the object, and the truth precedes 
its occurrence in signs. On this model, signs are then 
interpreted or re-animated in the mind of the perceiver. 
But the poet immediately renders this "relation" of 
idea-manifestation problematic. What one perceives is 
an idea, but this idea itself remains inconceivable. The 
idea is an idea that precedes the mind. It issues from 
an intentionality without a subject. And, even supposing 
that the ephebe could perceive the object purely, in what 
Nietzsche calls "the immaculate perception," it is not 
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an object that is being perceived, but the idea of an 
object. We are called to perceive that which by defintion 
can only appear before the higher reason of theoretical 
reflection, a higher reason that deliberately leaves the 
perceived world out of its considerations. Stevens lets 
this aporia remind readers that perception only occurs 
because ideation awaits the percept already; this means 
that perceptual experience occurs and must be expressible 
in terms of a particular context. And, since "blooded," 
ideation would be impossible without an embodied 
perspective. 
But, where deconstructive critique finds that sign 
and truth become enmeshed in a textual tangle at this point, 
it is important for our purposes to notice something else. 
Perception involves a kind of ideation all its own. Both 
phenomenology and deconstruction break down the clear 
distinction between conceiving subject and perceived object, 
but Merleau-Ponty and Stevens explore this preobjective 
realm rather than resting content to leave the distinction 
deconstructed. 
This realm is what the phenomenological approach 
investigates. Merleau-Ponty takes such an approach to 
Cezanne, and what Merleau-Ponty looks for in the latter, 
we may examine in Stevens. Like the Impressionists, Cezanne 
took nature as his model, but, unlike them, he wanted to 
catch the weight or the sensory impact of objects, to see 
objects before one judges about them. Depicting the object 
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as Impressionism does affords a true impression through 
the action of separate parts upon one another, but it also 
submerges the object and causes it to lose its power over 
the senses. Where Impressionism gives up the sensuous 
surface of the object for the sake of its impression, 
Cezanne wants to restore this surface. 
In Cezanne's late work, perspectival distortions are 
no longer visible in their own right, but rather contribute, 
as they do in natural vision, to the impression of an 
emerging order, of the object in the act of appearing, 
organizing itself before our senses. Merleau-Ponty applies 
his phenomenological method to Cezanne's later work and 
finds the immanence of the world-as-perceived before 
transcendent thought does any interpreting. As 
Merleau-Ponty says of Cezanne's portraits: 
"other minds are given to us only as incarnate, as 
belonging to faces and gestures. Countering with the 
distinctions of soul and body, thought and vision is 
of no use here, for Cezanne returns to just that 
primordial experience from which these notions are 
derived and in which they are inseparable (SN 16)." 
This phenomenological method lends itself especially 
well to an examination of Stevens' late work. Unlike Pound, 
and unlike the Impressionists, Stevens is not concerned 
with showing the object at its most objective, or in 
"luminous detail." Stevens wants instead to show the birth 
of perceptual order through spontaneous, prereflective 
organization. 
The body, Merleau-Ponty reminds us, acts like both 
a subject and an object, and the perceptible world never 
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appears primarily to the body in purely objectified form. 
The division of beings into subject and object therefore 
derives from the body's more basic being-in-the-world. 
When perception runs into anomalies, then reflection or 
"later reason" occurs, and the world divides up into 
subjects and objects. 
The tradition that interprets perception as subjective 
mistakenly takes second-order occurrences of conscious 
deliberation for the primary operation of perception. 
Western philosophy since Descartes assumes that representing 
subjects act on the implicit theories they entertain about 
the world, and that consciousness overlooks these implicit 
theories because they most often remain hidden. 
On this account, meaning-giving subjects condition 
their world. For Merleau-Ponty, however, the world is 
just immanent in embodied comportment, and our environment, 
our climate, and the things in it condition us. This is 
why Merleau-Ponty brings up Cezanne's quote that "the 
landscape thinks itself in me...and I am its consciousness" 
(17). For Merleau-Ponty and for Stevens, art is not the 
expression of an inner reality; nor is it a re-presentation 
of external reality. Through art, the thing arises and 
presents itself out of a set of viscous and equivocal 
appearances. Art "penetrates right to the root of things 
beneath the imposed order of humanity" (16). Of course, 
art does not penetrate all the way through the phenomenal 
world to a noumenal thing-in-itself, but it does reach 
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the prereflective realm of experience. 
Stevens, like Merleau-Ponty, catches and shows the 
arising of perception against a non-representable background 
and draws readers' attention to the ambiguity inherent 
in the disclosure of perceptible objects. Since we perceive 
everything from an embodied standpoint within the world, 
our perceptions are always referential, but also directed 
and meaningful. Like a soap bubble tends toward assuming 
a spherical shape, so too does perception tend, without 
implementing any intentionality, toward complete 
perceptions, though it never achieves a fully saturated 
perceptual experience. Perception completes itself in 
the world, and it is only upon taking an epistemic stance 
of theoretical reflection that one takes the world as an 
independent reality over against the mind. Critics of 
Stevens most often "come in too late," and assume that 
Stevens uncritically accepts, in order to put into play, 
the mind-world relation. 
But the study of perception alone does not adequately 
address what is of interest in "Notes." The poem also 
speaks insistently about poetic language and obsesses itself 
with the origins, the means and the ends of poetry. Poetry 
must speak not only about meaning in perception, but also 
about meaning in language and about the relation that 
obtains between perception and language. 
Just as there is a pre-objective but nonetheless real 
level on which perception makes sense of non-sense, so 
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too there is a level on which language shows itself more 
authentically than it does in everyday speech. And, as 
perceptual experience necessarily admits of a background, 
language also makes sense only in reference to a background. 
As linguistics has noted, phonemes carry no intrinsic 
significance, but signify only in relation to other 
phonemes, just as perceived objects never appear free of 
relations. 
Like the light that cannot itself be seen, this 
background renders the world intelligible. But, since 
it gives rise to perception and language, it remains 
unperceived and unnamable. It is not an "it," but if 
the modern work of art finds itself prevented from asking 
what is this background, it may nonetheless ask, what is 
it like? What metaphor, for example, what trope tropes 
itself as that which in its own hiding lets us encounter 
and name things? 
What applies to the phenomenological account of the 
ambiguous, referential character of perception, resonates 
with the postmodern commentary on the enigmatic, irreducible 
otherness of language. Language, or "Langue," as a 
differential structure, allows speakers to signify in speech 
and in scriptive acts, or "parole," while hiding, i.e. 
without ordinarily revealing the (de) structuring movement 
at the heart of language. Existential, or better, 
en-worlded phenomenology, remarks the referential structure 
of perception and notes the ways in which "perception hides 
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its activity of organization and leads us to see objects 
as independent entities" (SN xii). 
In both cases of language and perception, some 
background, itself detached and self-less, while embodied 
in each perceiver and speaker, withdraws while revealing 
entities, eliciting our response to others and calling 
speech to speak after it. So, when Kenner says of Eliot, 
for example, "[h]e has withdrawn in favor of language," 
Kenner implies that Eliot, at least stylistically, has 
put himself in touch with this background. 
Merleau-Ponty*s notion of the background of unreason 
— the notion that reason presupposes an "un[-]reasoning," 
pre-reason that gives a "perceptual faith in the independent 
solidity of objects," — seems to share a great deal with 
Stevens' notion of the "first idea." This "idea" is not 
itself an idea, but it is primordially idea-like and primary 
in the sense that it makes all ideation possible. Since 
it is no concept, this idea can never be experienced 
directly. (It) cannot be experienced directly not because 
it is some ineffable presence, but because (it) must ab-sent 
itself in order to pre-sent a perceptible world. As such 
an absence, Stevens may only trace the shadow or the distant 
echo of this idea. So the poet, rather than naming this 
background, calls our attention to its strange power to 
hide and to disclose, to shift and to unify.• And, in 
drawing our attention to this background, the poet makes 
us aware that our faith in the stability of names and the 
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solidity of objects is indeed a faith. 
The poet of "Notes" gives readers a fine example of 
such poetic, tentative naming in the initial stanzas of 
the poem: 
"Phoebus is dead, ephebe. But Phoebus was 
The name for something that never could be named. 
There was a project for the sun and is. 
There is a project for the sun. The sun 
Must bear no name, gold flourisher, but be 
In the difficulty of what it is to be" (CP 381). 
As noted, the background of perception is like the 
light in a room, or the light from the sun. It lets us 
perceive objects while it remains hidden. As the horizon 
of intelligibility, the sun should remind readers of 
Heraclitus' notion of "The One" which "is willing and is 
not willing to be called by the name of Zeus (of Life)" 
(B 32). Heraclitus understood that to name this background 
is to do violence to it, as naming reduces it to the status 
of the objects that it reveals. This mention of the sun 
should also remind readers, as it reminds Patricia Parker 
(WSJ 84), of Plato. 
Plato took over from Heraclitus the sense of that which 
makes naming and perception possible, but, in naming it 
"eidos," Plato missed what is commonly called the 
"ontological difference" between the background that lets 
beings appear and the beings that appear, and so reduced 
this background to the status of an entity. Since this 
background could not be said to belong to the sensory world, 
philosophy and poetry have, generally speaking, over the 
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centuries since Platonic thought, located the source of 
intelligibility in the supersensory: the ideas, a god, 
"Man's" "transcendental unity of apperception" and an 
animistic conception of "Nature" to name a few candidates 
for the subjects of history. 
But Stevens returns readers' attention to the issue 
of "the inconceivable idea of the sun." Phoebus, a name 
for "The One" and for the super-sensory, ideal sun, can 
no longer appear; nor can any other extra-worldly "onto-
theological" source of intelligibilty, be it reason, the 
Christian god, or the mind, hold sway over our comportment. 
"Phoebus is dead." Despite the death of Phoebus, though, 
the poet will still trace the background that gives names 
and perceptual objects. The poet, and readers of the poem, 
still want a name, if tentative rather than metaphysical, 
for that which makes naming possible: the "name for 
something that never could be named." This will be the 
"project for the sun": to show its process of shining 
without showing itself or letting this shining become a 
noun. 
But every time that the poet seeks out a name for this 
verb which "[m]ust bear no name," the poet must alight 
upon a physical thing or ordinary name, such as "gold 
flourisher." Realizing this, the poet also sees that this 
is "the difficulty of what it is to be." To be means to 
dwell between chaos and order, between the stable, rational 
world of words and things and the irrational, wholly other 
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world that lets these come to light. 
On the traditional account of language, thought exists 
fully present to the speaking subject in the form of mental 
representations, or, in the case of epistemologically 
oriented psychology, these representations remain veiled 
but still exist pre-linguistically. To convey a thought, 
then, is to put these representations into the words that 
one finds available in the algorithm of language that exists 
as a system of symbols and set of rules independent of 
the mind. After the representation has been communicated 
in speech or writing, the receiver hears acoustic blasts 
or sees lines scrawled on paper, and interprets these 
linguistic data, much as the perceiver is thought to 
interpret sense data, into meaningful representations. 
In response to the traditional notions of language, 
however, Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative consideration. 
For Merleau-Ponty, thought does not exist prior to its 
expression, but rather thought comes about in the expressive 
act. According to Merleau-Ponty, "self-possession and 
coincidence with the self do not serve to define thought, 
which is, on the contrary, an outcome of expression" (PP 
389). In response to the tradition, Merleau-Ponty notices 
that "the expression...moulds and animates the 
reader...putting into the hidden mouth of his mind the 
message of a certain object or a certain feeling." (Ibid.) 
Presupposing the notion of the speaking subject in order 
to do away with it, Merleau-Ponty continues: "In the 
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speaking subject, utterance does not illustrate ready-made 
thought, but makes that thought its own" (390). One speaks, 
and then one knows what one thinks. 
Because the referential totality that forms the 
background of language involves a surplus of signifieds \ 
over signifiers, one cannot help but find more possible 
meaning in one's words than occurred to one upon speaking. 
Perception and language only work by outstripping 
themselves, promising to speakers more than is there to 
give. Perception organizes sense data, and expression 
organizes linguistic data. Both perception and expression 
may then give to consciousness the illusion that it 
constitutes experience and expression. 
As the idea of the perceiving subject disappeared in 
the investigation of the immanence of the world to thought, 
so the idea of the fully self-present speaking subject 
falls before the fact that once uttered, the speaker's 
words may change meaning and the speaker's intentions 
necessarily outstrip and modify themselves in speech: "As 
for the speaking subject, he too must be enabled to outrun 
what he thought before, and to find in his own words more 
than he thought he was putting into them" (PP 394). Since 
the speaking subject always outruns itself, and linguistic 
arbitrariness leads thought in new directions, there can 
be no sense to the idea of the separation of speaker and 
world. The speaker cannot control the meanings of words 
any more than intentionality can control perception. 
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Just as there are no interpretation-free sense data, 
there are no interpretation-free linguistic data. 
Perception gives us solid objects by veiling its own 
organizing activity, as language gives significance to 
words by hiding its own referential structure. Objects 
appear to perception pre-interpreted, while ready-made 
expression, also essentially metaphorical in its 
referentiality, awaits thought which is always dim and 
unformulated, so that the latter may complete itself in 
a gesture of reaching out to the expression that stands 
ready for it. 
Merleau-Ponty gives the example of expression as this 
gesture that primordially gives thought and world to each 
other by thinking about someone walking around in a dimly 
lit room. The person cannot see, touches something, and 
cannot sense what the object is by feel or sight. Suddenly, 
this person says the word "brush" and the thought falls 
into place. In this case, as is generally the case in 
ordinary language, expression gives thought a perceptual 
"grip" on the world that thought pervades. 
But, despite their similarities, language seems more 
flexible than body-perception. Cultural perception changes, 
as does individual perceptual habit by what Merleau-Ponty 
calls a series of small "deflections," but the tendency 
to see the moon as larger on the horizon than at the zenith, 
for example, seems more "sedimented" than do history and 
psychology. In everyday speech, or what Merleau-Ponty 
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calls "constituted" language, words give the impression 
of relative fixity: "words gradually accumulate a 
significance" which, though necessarily impossible to 
establish absolutely, seems nonetheless shared. 
But there is another kind of language. Though 
Merleau-Ponty is careful to avoid hierarchies and to refrain 
from drawing too fine a distinction between them, he does 
find that constituted language both rests upon and 
contributes to what he calls poetic language. 
The relation of these two types of language seems 
somewhat circular: poetic language involves the process 
of a new thought struggling to establish itself by "bending 
the resources of constituted language to some fresh usage" 
(PP 396). But this fresh usage in turn gives expressions 
that will become part of constituted language: "it is 
because it has been used in various contexts that the word 
gradually accumulates a significance" (388). In this 
circle, distinctions between subject and object, thought 
and expression and fresh and used fall away, as they did 
in the examination of perception, so that this examination 
might return "to just that primordial experience from which 
these notions are derived and in which they are inseparable" 
Merleau-Ponty calls this poetic or pre-prosaic level 
of language "le langage parlant," as opposed to the everyday 
level of language, which he calls "le Langage parle" 
(PW 145). And, as Stevens fleshes out the pre-objective 
level of perception, he also shows that it is the job of 
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poetry to self-consciously disclose this poetic level of 
language. As Stevens remarks in "An Ordinary Evening in 
New Haven," "the theory of poetry is the life of poetry" 
(CP 486). "Notes" also strives to show that constituted 
or prosaic language depends upon this deeper level of 
language which, while itself ambiguous, also tends toward 
relatively complete contexts. Disclosing the creation 
of new sense from old is another way that Stevens catches 
the emergence of sense and order in the world. 
In the examination of linguistic meaning, readers of 
"Notes" find yet another sense in which Stevens' use of 
the verb to catch comes into play. As Merleau-Ponty puts 
it, the poem "catches" like a fire. As he says, the poem 
relies upon, and then "melts" ordinary language: "I start 
to read idly...and suddenly, a few words move me, the fire 
catches, my thoughts are ablaze, there is no word I can 
overlook....! am giving and receiving in the same gesture" 
(PW 11). Merleau-Ponty continues; "The author has come 
to dwell in my world. Then, imperceptibly, he varies the 
ordinary meaning of the signs, and like a whirlwind they 
sweep me along toward the other meaning with which I am 
going to connect" (12). Stevens' "Notes" catches this 
catching, this whirlwind of language, as it caught the 
arising of perception. Images of golden things, turning 
things, maculate things and flying things, for example, 
recur throughout the poem, and yet each time one of these 
images appears, its nuances of difference from seemingly 
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similar images gives it an increased conceptual thickness. 
Poetry draws attention to the way that it challenges 
ordinary language. It makes use of standard significations, 
not to reinforce them, but to refigure them. As we saw 
with Cezanne, "the painter rearranges the prosaic world 
and, so to speak, makes a holocaust of objects" (PW 63). 
Merleau-Ponty shows that the painter undoes our geometrical 
conceptions of the world, "just as poetry melts ordinary 
language" (ibid.). In poetry, the order that poetry 
reveales is not a prepositional order. In ordinary terms, 
in fact, the poem is disorder, or a disordering of our 
everyday use of language. But, just as for Stevens "a 
violent disorder is an order" (CP 215), for Merleau-Ponty, 
"poetic disorder is always another order. It is a new 
system of equivalences which demands this upheaval and 
not just any one, and it is in the name of a truer relation 
among things that their ordinary ties are broken" (PW 64). 
When we reason about poetry with a reasoning that is itself 
no longer poetic, it seems as though metaphor has 
transformed things by breaking their ordinary ties. 
What does poetic language have to be like in order 
that it might capture prereflective perceptual experience 
and re-gestalt constituted language in the above mentioned 
ways? "It must be abstract": there is an inaccessible and 
referential character to experience and to "speaking" 
language. That words and experiences may be abstracted 
from any single context against a background that withdraws 
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is the condition of their life. "It must change"; not 
objects and significations themselves, but the contexts 
in which they appear must remain ambiguous enough that 
they may change; if contexts and percepts were absolutely 
fixed, one could have no experiences at all. "It must 
give pleasure": one might assume that mere aesthetic 
pleasure results when one's judgments about objects and 
the meanings of one's words are confirmed. But this is 
not the type of poetically genuine pleasure that comes 
from the experience of encountering prereflective perception 
and finding a new, "truer" relation among things after 
poetry has melted ordinary language. 
One point remains. It may have become evident that 
the phenomenological account of meaning in perception and 
language shares much with post-phenomenological, 
specifically, deconstructive accounts of meaning. Both 
philosophies point up the unrepresentability of a background 
(differance) that gives sense while hiding, both show the 
necessary ambiguity of meaning, the decisive undecidability 
that enables meaning, and the fact that the success of 
meaningful experience is always already predicated upon 
its liability to failure. But Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology 
differs decisively in two ways from deconstruction. And 
it is these differences that will prove pivotal in the 
further examination of "Notes" and the question of semantic 
teleology. 
The first of these two differences, hinted at earlier. 
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is not as important as the second. Phenomenology takes 
its scrutiny beyond the point at which structural 
distinctions like those of mind and world, truth and 
fiction, and thought and expression dissolve. Merleau-Ponty 
does not so much insist on the aporia that de-positions 
distinctions of subject and object, for example, as he 
investigates the experience of what it is like to be both, 
and neither, subject and object. 
The second of the two differences between deconstruction 
and phenomenology concerns the point of teleology. When 
Merleau-Ponty gives his account of meaning and the 
background, he tends to speak of a referential structure. 
When Derrida talks about this background, however, he 
prefers to mention it as a differential structure. This 
is not a mere difference in choice of words. For 
Merleau-Ponty there is a point at which referentiality 
stops and a close approximation to definitive meaning 
arises. Neither the intentionality of the subject nor 
an objective state of affairs in the world limits meaning, 
but language just tends toward elliptical, temporary and 
tentative contexts that disclose and vouchsafe 
significations. As Merleau-Ponty states, "what gives its 
meaning to each word is the sentence" (PP 388). And the 
objects in the perceptual field just tend to "motivate" 
themselves into the approximation of a meaningful gestalt. 
Since perception and the body are given, primary phenomena 
for Merleau-Ponty, that is since reason and judgment arise 
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from embodied perception, the play of meaning is, in the 
last analysis, stabilized by the body. 
One might argue that insofar as their methodologies 
and domains differ so much, any comparison between 
phenomenology and deconstruction remains unwarranted. 
But, since both take up the question of the indeterminacy 
of meaning and of a true or spurious teleology that limits 
meaning, both must answer the charges of the other. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, "it is easy to strip language 
and action of all meaning and to make them seem 
absurd....But that other miracle, the fact that in an absurd 
world language and behavior do have meaning for those who 
speak and act, remains to be understood" (SN xvi). What 
Merleau-Ponty says of politics applies equally to what 
he thinks about our capacity to take over and make sense 
of spontaneity and indeterminacy: We find ourselves "thrown 
with other men into a drama which will not necessarily 
end well but which at all events is moving toward some 
end" (SN xix). The poem does obey a teleo-logic; perception 
and language still move toward some end. Just because 
meanings are never founded on metaphysical ground, there 
is no reason to assume that no interpretations hold sway 
over us. 
So, while Merleau-Ponty would upbraid anyone who asked 
what the "Supreme Fiction" is or means, he would also 
discourage findings that reveal "Notes" to be merely a 
commentary on the undecidable moment of meaning and the 
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endless refiguration of the metaphorical-literal relation. 
Merleau-Ponty, presumably, would ask about the function 
of the supreme fiction and how it is experienced. And 
it seems that this fiction works much like intentionality 
works, although there is no intending subject behind it. 
Perceptual and linguistic experience, notes, move toward 
fulfillment of a telos or final, supreme fiction, though 
in order for them to work they must remain forever prevented 
from attaining it. This does not prevent limited contexts 
from emerging, however. This fiction, this telos, is 
supreme in the sense that it is the condition of the 
possibility of all poetic and fictive styles of rediscovery 
of the world. 
II: The "Fluent Mundo" 
"There is a project for the sun. The sun 
Must bear no name, gold flourisher, but be 
In the difficulty of what it is to be" 
(CP 380). 
All perception and all language can be called inherently 
figurative in the sense that perceptual experiences, 
concepts and words carry no intrinsic meaning, but find 
what sense they have by pointing beyond themselves. 
Deconstructive as well as Existential-phenomenological 
philosophies, although their differences remain significant, 
concur on the issue of the referentiality of meaning. 
Critics of Stevens' "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction," like 
Patricia Parker, Joseph Riddel and Joseph Kronick, remain 
attuned to this referential understanding of meaning (WSJ). 
These critics find that "the difficulty of what it is to 
be" equals the difficulty of striving, always in vain, 
for self-present identity: for full clarity of independent 
objects in perception, for unequivocal meaning in language, 
and for non-referential, a-temporal selfhood in 
consciousness. 
"Notes," seeks no such saturated identity. Critics 
who think of Stevens as a poet in search of "reality" or 
the "self" fail to notice that he quite noticeably never 
finds either. Stevens presupposes no essences, and in 
this critical stance he adumbrates the postmodern emphasis 
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on plurality and play. But despite his celebration of 
referentiality — his exploration of the being of ambiguity 
and of the ambiguity of being — Stevens maintains what 
could be called a sense of seriousness. "Notes" 
self-consciously strives to reach a singular "myth before 
the myth began,/ Venerable and articulate and complete" 
(383). 
The poem moves toward a singular, "supreme fiction," 
despite the poet's understanding that this quest must fail. 
Any fiction, understood as narrative, myth, or context, 
if it tends to reveal all experience in just one singular 
or supreme way, cannot articulate all the variegated styles 
that it would subsume, and dissolves into a variety of 
notes. But Stevens still finds in language a tendency 
toward gathering and articulation that he will not ignore. 
This tension between unity and separation leads the poet 
to note that "[W]e move between these points:/ From that 
ever-early candor to its late plural" (380). This 
"movement" remarks the circular interdependence of 
figuration (characterized by plurality and play) and 
propriety (characterized by singularity and seriousness) 
in forming modes of revealing that give meaning to 
experience and language. 
In the poem, as in our everyday comportment, we 
perceivers and agents tend to encounter words, things and 
others as intelligible and identifiable, while at other 
times we find our previous understandings of things and 
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others to be in a state of transformation. So it seems 
proper to ask what conditions Stevens puts on the 
determinacy of meaning, or better, whether Stevens thinks 
identity or difference conditions intelligibility. In 
short, it makes sense to ask; does the poem prioritize 
"uncertain light" or "certain truth" (380)? 
The poem prioritizes neither, though, choosing instead 
to inspect the miraculous and mysterious process that makes 
temporarily abiding sense from non-sense, that tends toward 
identity as it admits its indebtedness to difference and 
that gives stable meanings to phenomena that appear in 
a world that is "equal in living changingness to the light" 
(380). "Notes" functions primarily as a meditation on 
the way that sense, identity and meaning "happen," while 
this poetic meditation also makes its readers cognizant 
of the role of poetry in unveiling the meaning-giving 
process. The poem not only forges new relations, but 
comments on this relating, saying that "life's nonsense 
pierces us with strange relation" (383). 
Heidegger's word for the process whereby meaning arises 
is Ereignis. Stated briefly, this process is the tendency 
of experiences, practices, styles, words and myths to gather 
together into relatively stable modes of revealing. This 
"gentle law" behind language and perception leaves an 
element of indeterminacy to language, events and percepts, 
while it gives them depth, texture and clarity. Ereignis 
is variously translated as "event," "happening," 
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"Appropriation" and "en-owning." But this last term seems 
the most useful translation, because en-owning bespeaks 
the process by which an experience "comes into its own" 
when revealed in a way suited to it. This process of 
Ereignis drives language and gives identities of every 
sort. 
When something comes into its own, however, it does 
not finally reach what could be called a natural kind or 
true essence; it merely resonates most deeply within the 
style that reveals it. "Notes" subtly reveals new 
connections between things while showing that these new 
connections tend to deepen themselves: 
"The lion roars at ihe enraging desert. 
Reddens the sand with his red-colored noise 
Defies red emptiness to evolve his match 
Master by foot and jaws and by the mane. 
Most supple challenger. The elephant 
Breaches the darkness of Ceylon with blares. 
The glitter-goes on surfaces of tanks. 
Shattering velvetest far-away. The bear. 
The ponderous cinnamon, snarls in his mountain 
At summer thunder and sleeps through winter snow" 
(384). 
Here, Stevens implies that lion and desert, elephant 
and darkness, bear and weather remain apart from each other 
until a primitive form of speaking occurs. It makes no 
sense to speak of the desert, of nighttime and of the 
seasons, or to see these under any aspect at all, until 
they receive characterization in relation to speech. Of 
course, the lion, elephant and bear are not speaking, but 
nevertheless it seems that they do offer a kind of primal 
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poem: through the lion's reddening roar, the elephant's 
breaching blare and the bear's snarl, the lion comes into 
its own as defiant, the desert comes into its own as "red" 
and "enraging," a sense of near and far emerges, and the 
seasons take on richer meaning in relation to the cinnamon 
snarl. 
Examples of Stevens' implied understanding that new 
images tend to mutually inform each other and give sense 
abound in "Notes." The poem also tells readers about the 
moment, 
"when the sun comes rising, when the sea 
Clears deeply, when the moon hangs on the wall 
of heaven haven. These are not things transformed." 
(399). 
When Stevens tells readers that "the sun comes 
rising,...the sea clears deeply,...the moon hangs on the 
wall of heaven-haven" and that the lion, elephant and bear 
color their surroundings, he implies that sun, sea, moon, 
desert, darkness and weather have no pure own-ness, or 
proper essence outside of language, and yet ̂  the same 
time he implies that they tend to give sense to each other 
and to come into their own more than they tend to transform 
their sense for transformation's sake. That is, since 
Stevens' language in the above cases remains notably 
figurative and referential, and tends to call for the 
"freshness of transformation" (397) of previous 
understandings, readers cannot possibly think of a roar, 
for example, as somehow essentially red. But Stevens also 
reminds us that "these are not things transformed." These 
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images do not change gratuitously, but in accordance with 
the process by which they come to resonate with each other 
in new ways. 
In encountering these images, we leave our familiar 
"signifying soil" (PW 87), but this movement does not leave 
us alienated. Rather, as Stevens introduces us to what 
Merleau-Ponty calls a "new style of thinking" (S 91), this 
style dawns upon readers and fills meaning into the above 
objects. Stevens sweeps readers toward "the other meaning 
with which they are going to connect" (PW 12) and lets 
readers perceive things acquiring new depth. This new 
depth gives "a truer relation among things" (64). When 
language lets us perceive previously unthought connections 
between things, this inspires wonder. But more relevant 
to Stevens' and Merleau-Ponty's purposes of revealing 
sense-making, is that we sense a new and self-perpetuating 
resonance among things once new connections announce 
themselves. Merleau-Ponty would read Stevens' challenging 
images, like he reads all exemplary expressions in general, 
as a "recentering," and not a de-centering, of "the 
expressive apparatus" (S 91). 
And Heidegger's account of Ereignis meshes with 
Merleau-Ponty's. As Heidegger says, "what determines... 
beings in their own, that is, in their belonging together, 
we shall call Ereignis" (TB 19). This "belonging together" 
of course changes over time. According to one Heidegger 
critic, Ereignis depends upon difference and 
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referentiality: "[Ereignis] allows for the revealing of 
things in such a way that it is understood that they show 
up differently, under different aspects, in various modes 
of revealing" (HR 287). But this process also gives 
identity: "Ereignis is the tendency of revealing to reveal 
particular things in the mode best suited to the kind of 
thing they are" (ibid.). Although logically these two 
understandings seem like antinomies, ultimately they do 
not conflict with, but complement each other. 
"Notes" brings this en-owning process into its own 
and reveals the complex process of revealing. One method 
by which Stevens brings en-owning into its own is through 
his use of catachresis. When the poet speaks about the 
"uncertain light of single, certain truth," about "a moment 
in the central of our being" and about "the vivid 
transparence" (prologue), he speaks of certainty, of a 
center and of visibility in the terms of changing 
perspective, of fleeting moments, and of invisibility, 
respectively. This sense of the interdependence of the 
visible and the invisible will resonate later with the 
poet's discussion of "unseeing": 
"It must be visible or invisible. 
Invisible or visible or both: 
A seeing and unseeing in the eye" (385). 
There is always something left invisible in every event 
of en-owning. For anything to emerge into visibility, 
not only must the openness in which it emerges remain 
invisible, but it must be understood that different aspects 
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under which it has been and may be revealed suggest 
themselves. "Unseeing" is this tendency to see beyond 
the presently revealed properties of objects and to see 
past the "casual" (397), i.e. accepted relations that obtain 
between them to their potential for transformation. 
An "unseeing in the eye" is a logically inconsistent 
image. Literally, catachresis means "false form (or 
usage)." But Stevens' false forms have a purpose; they 
get at the way things relate to, and deepen their meanings 
in reference to, other things. Stevens* catachretic style 
suggests that "Notes" taken as a whole mirrors the lines 
within it that address "false flick, false form, but 
falseness close to kin" (385). Stevens' "falseness" allows 
a kinship to emerge and hold sway over new images. 
Both Stevens' and Heidegger's styles violate the law 
of non-contradiction. But ultimately this is irrelevant 
because they share an impulse to show the pre-logical force 
that deepens meaning and lets things become increasingly 
determinate. As Richard McClearly remarks, Merleau-Ponty, 
too, stresses that things appear in "relatively but never 
fully constituted horizons, linked together in a 
pre-objective order of their own by a constituting [non-
representational] consciousness" (S 13). Experiences become 
meaningful, they come into their own, not despite, but 
owing to their ability to appear differently under different 
aspects, to resonate with other experiences over time and 
to shine most vividly when they can appear in manifold. 
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"invisible" (non-thematized) styles of comportment. 
Clearly, Stevens' process of "bright-dark... chiaroscuro" 
based en-lightening, like Heidegger's process of 
variety-based en-owning, and Merleau-Ponty's process of 
pre-objective ordering are fundamental as well as complex 
examinations of the complicated process of making sense 
from non-sense. 
One might object that Stevens is not the only poet 
who uses novel metaphorical images and interesting instances 
of catachresis. And this is right. However, Stevens does 
not use tropes to re-figure and re-imagine things, but 
to examine the process by which things may be imagined 
at all. Stevens scrutinizes traditional, metaphysical 
notions of the self and language, and the fact that he 
problematizes the traditional notion of an in-itself 
"reality," along with the notion of the subject-object 
relation, and the roles of metaphor and context, while 
he questions the invisible source of the visible, brings 
Stevens to the deep level of investigation on which 
Heidegger's examination of Ereignis moves. Of course other 
poets before and since Stevens have examined all of the 
above issues, but later Stevens seems almost singular in 
his obsession with the uncertain light that enables 
perception and the metaphorical nature of everyday 
statements. 
Merleau-Ponty's and Heidegger's accounts resonate with 
each other and apply to Stevens' phenomenological poetics 
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on a deep level. For Heidegger, human being, "the being 
whose being is an issue for it," and whose way of being 
is "there," in the world of its commitments, stands out 
or "ek-sists" within an open field of possibilities that 
it finds primordially given with its background. One finds 
oneself always already beholden to and beheld by the world. 
This world is for the most part familiar, that is, one 
dwells in it: one never finds things equally near and 
equally far within one's everyday, committed involvement, 
but things matter to, even condition, one. Equiprimordial 
with this mattering, or with the general mood that colors 
certain commitments as important and others as trivial, 
is understanding, or the ability to reflect on what is 
always already pre-given. 
Ereiqnis means the process by which practices tend 
to gather themselves into "regions" of intelligibility 
or modes of disclosing things as meaning-ful. And these 
regions hold sway over the human way of being while human 
beings hold on to them. Ereignis, as the gathering tendency 
behind language, lets human beings speak after it: "we 
listen...to hear the inner sense of our words in the way 
they articulate the practices in which we are engaged" 
(HR 288). This is how "Ereiqnis grants to mortals their 
abode within their nature, so that they may be capable 
of being those who speak" (WL 128). 
"Being-in-the-world," in Heidegger as in Merleau-Ponty, 
is prereflective, that is, it precedes subjective 
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consciousness. For Heidegger, one presses into 
possibilities given to one by the public, tacit 
understanding of what it means to be human. What one does, 
one does for-the-sake-of enacting oneself as a particular 
instance of this or that type of human being. People with 
the predisposition to be students, for example, use pens, 
books, word processors and theses, among other things, 
for the sake of being a student. Thus, the context of 
studious practices gathers together with other practices 
(driving to buy pens, biking to class, and eating cheap 
food quickly, for example) to reveal equipment, practices 
and people in the way most appropriate to this student 
style. This for-the-sake-of, which reveals things in the 
most resonant way, is Ereignis. 
Of course, not everything appears in its own-most if 
everything resonates within just one style. Students also 
use pens to belatedly balance checkbooks, they use bikes 
in the park and they eat well-prepared family meals. And 
they have different styles in which they encounter (reveal) 
equipment, events and others under different aspects. 
Ereignis depends upon the existence of a plurality of styles 
in order to deepen meaning across styles. 
An obsessive person, on the individual level, and 
Western metaphysics, on the cultural level, afford examples 
of the way that Ereignis gets stifled. Most people 
encounter others differently under different aspects: the 
other can be revealed as friend, authority figure. 
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competitor, co-worker and many other ways at other times. 
But for someone with an inferiority complex, for example, 
never is the other encountered as anything but inferior 
or superior. In the case of the obsessive, the singularity 
of en-owning causes it to disappear: the depth of 
interpersonal relations is leveled-over, and the world 
appears in a monochrome, "single, certain light" that never 
changes. 
Similarly, our entire culture loses sight of en-owning 
when it takes up with things solely as technological 
resources: friends become "networking" resources, we 
encounter houses as units for shelter, food shows up as 
instant nourishment and, as Heidegger says, "the earth 
becomes a huge filling-station" (QCT 16). The above cases 
seek to show that Ereignis, to be brought into its own, 
requires that identity and difference play off of and 
mutually enable each other. 
"Notes" looks at the process of revealing anything 
as determinate and problematizes the issue of the meaning 
of sounds, words, metaphors, contexts, the poem itself, 
perception, selves and language. The poem draws readers' 
attention to these issues and asks what degree of 
determinacy is required to give them sense. 
And the poem comments on its own ability to provide 
modes of revealing that place new sets of phonemes into 
meaningful relations: 
"We say: At night an Arabian in my room. 
With his damned hoobla-hoobla-hoobla-how 
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Inscribes a primitive astronomy 
Across the unscrawled fores the future casts 
And throws his stars around the floor. By day 
The wood-dove used to chant his hoobla-hoo 
And still the grossest iridescence of ocean 
Howls hoo and rises and howls hoo and falls. 
Life's nonsense pierces us with strange relation" 
(CP 383). 
In this passage, the "hooblas," "hoos" and "hows" come 
to take on a meaning in relation not only to each other, 
but in relation to other "h" sounds like "howl" and to 
the cycles of day and night, speaking and chanting, rising 
and falling and past ("used to"), present ("inscribes") 
and future. These sounds do not have a literal meaning, 
and in fact they have no figurative meaning either. They 
cannot even be called onomotopoetic since they refer to 
a plurality of events. Nevertheless, these sounds resonate 
with each other and even bind each canto's different style 
to the others'. The poem notes both the plurality of 
aspects under which these sounds appear and their tendency 
toward increasing resonance over time. Most importantly, 
the poem itself comments upon its own obsession with the 
ambiguity necessary for identity. The poem reveals its 
subject-matter, and tells what it has just been showing, 
saying that "life's nonsense pierces us with strange 
relation." 
Stevens, like Merleau-Ponty, finds in language the 
two characteristics that Heidegger attributes to the 
meaning-giving process of Ereignis; the tendency of words 
and things to appear under different aspects and the 
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tendency of words and things to appear in such a way that 
they resonate with each other. 
Language and perception ultimately refer to themselves, 
rather than to a final, ontologically prior reality or 
to an ineffable experience. Therefore, no meaning is ever 
"proper" to — or positioned in the proximity of — an 
essence outside of figuration. As Stevens reminds his 
readers in allusion to Shelley, "the west wind" makes its 
music out of "iris frettings on the blank" (397). Nature, 
for Stevens, offers no primal words in which it might be 
described. Rather, all perception is a palimpsestic 
inscription laid over previous interpretations of this 
elemental "blank." The natural world offers no experience 
that does not show up in terms of other experiences. And 
language gives no signifier that is "anchored" in a 
signified or grounded in an extra-linguistic "reality." 
But if all meaningful action and speech are irreducibly 
figurative, whence do speakers and agents draw the inferred 
opposite: "proper," or literal, meaning? A deconstructive 
critic would suggest, as Patricia Parker does (WSJ 84), 
that the idea of the literal serves the implied indexical 
function or the "fiction" of pointing to a time preceding 
figuration, when words and things co-appeared openly, in 
"that ever-early candor" (CP 382), that is, with no residue 
of uncertainty. As Stevens says, "The poem, through candor, 
brings back a power again/ That gives a candid kind to 
everything" (ibid.). But this "power" serves an 
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interpretive function, it is not a natural kind. 
In Western languages, languages that strive for clarity, 
non-contradiction and closure, the syntactic structure 
of the sentence, a subject with its predicate, mirrors 
the metaphysical understanding of reality as comprised 
of substances with their properties. And this 
metaphysically-oriented understanding of language furthers 
itself by giving evidence of an essence, origin and singular 
referent that remains outside the world of changing 
existents. The idea of this essence "satisfies/ Belief 
in an immaculate beginning// And sends us.../ To an 
immaculate end" (CP 383). But at the same time, if there 
were such a source and there were access to this source, 
language and history would stop. Western language requires 
the illusion of a center, which, if realized, would destroy 
language. The role of the proper, on the deconstructive 
account, is to act as a pseudo-ground, seeming to limit 
the play of significations that generates language. 
A deconstructive investigation into the figurative/ 
proper distinction reveals that the proper sense is always 
derivative of the figurative sense. As Derrida points 
out. Western thought must appreciate "the metaphorical 
nature of concepts, and most notably of the concept which 
seems to support literal, proper meaning" (MP 214). The 
proper makes sense only as a metaphor, and figuration is 
all-pervasive. 
Merleau-Ponty and Derrida draw different conclusions 
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from the fact that language and experience are inherently 
figurative. Traditionally, metaphor appears as either 
a decoration laid on top of a statement or as an heuristic 
through the use of which readers and speakers attain access 
to reality. The notion of metaphor as an access route 
to reality also presupposes a necessarily extra-linguistic 
essence that one might, despite its ineffability, talk 
about in other words. For Derrida, as the signifier 
necessarily floats away from any one signified, so the 
vehicle always outstrips the tenor. The metaphor, far 
from finding the truth behind the tenor, transforms the 
tenor itself, bringing it back into endlessly differential 
play with each new instance of metaphorization. 
For Merleau-Ponty, metaphor brings its components into 
their own, not in the sense of showing what they really 
are, but by giving them a new meaning in a new context: 
"meaning [in a literary work] is given, in the first 
instance, not so much by [the work's] ideas as by a 
systematic and unexpected variation of the modes of 
language, of narrative, or of existing literary forms. 
This accent, this particular modulation of speech — 
if the expression is successful — is assimilated little 
by little by the reader..." (UT 6). 
Metaphor, as "variation," neither decorates an idea 
nor finds reality. But neither does metaphor re-figure 
meaning arbitrarily and gratuitously. Metaphor makes things 
meaningful by revealing them in a way that is most resonant 
with the poem's new context and the style that the reader 
is assimilating. 
Stevens does not talk about metaphor so much as he 
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uses metaphors, along with other tropes and syntactical 
and rhetorical machinery, in order to meditate on the way 
that meaning in language and experience works. Ultimately, 
Stevens' questioning of language ̂  metaphor, image rhyme, 
sound juxtaposition and often confusing syntax leads him 
to a reading of language and perception that attempts to 
question anew the phenomenon of meaning. 
Though "Notes" addresses the role of indeterminacy 
in the generation of meaning, one can also say that the 
poem reads as a study of what is required for the impression 
of a determinate meaning to emerge. Riddel is only 
partially correct, then, when he says that "the problematic 
of 'Notes' rests on [Stevens' as well as criticism's] 
incapacity to decode or resolve the epistemological 
relativism of subject and object" (WSJ 67). This 
"incapacity" results from Stevens' ontological inquiry 
into the source of notions such as subject and object. 
In response to Riddel, an alternative, "enworlded," 
phenomenological reading suggests that the problematic 
of "Notes" actually rests on the capacity that contexts 
have, including the contexts that give subjects and objects, 
to give sense and yet at the same time to maintain their 
flexibility. "Notes" becomes the field in which the poet 
plays out the strife between the "ever-early candor" and 
"its late plural," between context construction and context 
deconstruction. 
Considering these readings of language and experience. 
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one might respond, firstly, that contexts can and do exist, 
and that they limit meaning, if not decisively then at 
least efficiently enough to significantly reduce the number 
of possible readings of linguistic and sensory experience. 
Secondly, one might say that Stevens certainly entertains 
no such radical view of the metaphoricity of everything. 
Critics that espouse the idea of ground-level 
figurality, however, also challenge the notion of the 
stability of contexts. And Stevens' response to the 
traditional notion and function of the context is even 
more problematic than is his stance toward figuration. 
If the poet of "Notes" remains unhappy with meaning as 
fundamentally figural, it is equally unlikely that he treats 
the trope simply as a source of knowledge about the mind 
and the world. When mind and world, conceived as two 
independent entities, do appear in "Notes," their appearance 
is haunted by the many different perspectives that the 
poem takes upon them, 
Merleau-Ponty surrenders the Western notion of subjects 
and objects as well as showing the referentiality of 
experience. This is why Merleau-Ponty, like Derrida, is 
not nostalgic for a golden age of full presence. And 
Merleau-Ponty and Derrida seem to share a common notion 
of meaning: Merleau-Ponty*s background seems to exhibit 
the same structural features as Derrida's differance. 
But there is a difference. Differance structures itself 
as graphematic, or operates through the differential play 
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of signification that gives the illusion of identity, and 
therefore this background is writing-like, i.e. structured 
by its ability to function in the non-presence of any one, 
limiting intention. Since, according to Derrida, they 
constantly point beyond their present, signification and 
experience can never acquire depth. 
For deconstruction, the natural world offers no 
experience that does not show up and transform itself in 
terms of other experiences. Attunement to this 
transformation restores a sense of wonder to the world-text. 
For Merleau-Ponty, however, the natural world offers no 
experience that does not show up and tend to deepen itself 
in terms of other experiences. This deepening gives density 
and dimensionality to the world-text. Stevens takes no 
metaphysical concepts for granted, and he too moves between 
the poles of Romanticism and postmodernism, investigating 
the status of both analogy and anomaly. 
"Notes" traces the character of the resonant deepening 
of contexts and the character of the transformation of 
contexts. Stevens implicitly targets for his investigation 
the question of the singularity of the context: He wonders 
how singular a context need be in order to give seriousness. 
Stevens never lets one context dominate the poem, or become 
overbearing, but neither is he light-hearted or playful. 
He treats both deepening and changability in their own 
rights, and at no point does he suggest an Aufhebunq to 
resolve this strife between plurality and singularity. 
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Stevens' "Notes" focuses on the "amassing harmony" 
(403) that deepens contexts and gives increasing amounts 
of resonance to words and images. Words, images and tropes 
articulate the poetic context in which they appear. 
Stevens' interest in language's tendency to gather and 
articulate itself into a deepening context in which words, 
in tuxn, gather meaning is reflected in his examination 
of the poem's tendency toward epiphany. This 
epiphany-directed gathering process is similar to 
Heidegger's conception of the "law" of language: 
"If we understand 'law' as the gathering that lays 
down that which causes all beings to be present in 
their own, in what is appropriate for them, then 
Ereignis is the plainest and most gentle of all 
laws"(WL 128). 
Heidegger's elaboration of the law that deepens contexts 
and in so doing assigns words, things and speakers to their 
own most resonant way of being seems much like Stevens' 
experiments with epiphanies and his attempts to find the 
right words for reality. But it would be wrong to say 
that the poem strives for the complete clarity and closure 
that an epiphany claims for the context in which it appears. 
Rather, "Notes" breaks off its several quests for epiphanies 
as the increasing resonance within contexts threatens the 
plurality necessary for meaningful experience. In "Ordinary 
Evening in New Haven," the poem does find the right words 
for reality, and these words are "and yet, and yet..." 
(CP 465). Implied in the notion of en-owning is the need 
for a plurality of contexts and different styles of 
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revealing. Just as Stevens shifts the tone of the poem 
when it gets too close to an epiphany, Heidegger remains 
very careful to "distinguish Ereignis from frantic, neurotic 
attempts at metaphysical closure" (HR 289). 
What is called en-owning or "Appropriation" (Ereignis) 
is not an occurrent entity, but the primordial process 
that gives ("Es gibt") time and Being. But en-owning is 
not simply the tendency of practices to gather together 
into meaningful modes of revealing, or the tendency of 
contexts to arise and to deepen themselves, although this 
constitutes its positive function. Implied in every event 
of appropriation is a simultaneous expropriation that 
indicates a structurally necessary, playful plurality that 
prevents one context from appropriating all others. Without 
this dis-owning, one would never experience the fundamental 
phenomena of Ereignis at all. 
Owing to the complexity of Stevens' not uncritical 
stance on the questions of subject and object, and mind 
and world, Parker seems unjustified in saying that "the 
apocalyptic impulse...has its counterparts in the ongoing 
attempts to purge language of its error and deviance, to 
regain a purity if not of transcendent truth then of the 
object or objective world, a project shared by Stevens 
himself" (WSJ 79). Since Stevens meditates on the issue 
of contexts, including contexts that give the appearance 
of transcendent subjects in an objective world, and since 
"Notes" remains aware of the metaphorical nature of the 
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concepts of self and other, Stevens cannot simply be accused 
of sharing in the Western projects of moving toward 
objectivity and of language-cleansing. 
Since Ereignis or "that-which-[gives]-regions," 
(DT 66) is a primordial given, as is the body for 
Merleau-Ponty, there is no sense in even speaking about 
a "one" here, as though to say one private, personal self, 
except insofar as anyone belongs firstly within the public 
world. For Merleau-Ponty, too, one has no right to 
presuppose the primacy of private life. One is, before 
all subjective reflection, being-in-the-world. One just 
takes over and embodies variations on a publicly available, 
prereflective style, in terms of which certain commitments 
make sense and others do not. When problems occur, or 
the lived world becomes obtrusive, the embodied perceiver 
reflects and becomes this particular self. Identity emerges 
only at this breakdown stage. 
For Merleau-Ponty we are not creatures with constantly 
shifting identities who only belatedly make sense of our 
lives, as we are for Derrida, but neither are we 
self-present, full identities. Rather, our bodies are 
committed to a style that tends to get a grip on 
possibilities, to make them its own by bringing them to 
resonate with this style. 
This discussion of Ereignis does not mean to limit 
this phenomenon to the realm of the individual. The Western 
style of being, for example, currently tends toward a 
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repressive resonance in terms of which anything and anyone 
is meaningful only insofar as it or they can be considered 
a resource for ever more efficient productivity. And, 
in literary analysis, the poem tends toward a unified voice 
or context in which its constituent elements may show up 
in the most resonant, although still highly polysemic way. 
Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger both stress the primordial 
role of the body and its commitments in giving meaning 
to experience. For Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger meaning 
arises within what Heidegger calls "modes of disclosing," 
and "regions," and within what Merleau-Ponty calls "styles" 
and contexts. Experiences are not allocated to regions 
by intentional consciousness, since this kind of 
consciousness presupposes "regioning." For Merleau-Ponty, 
while language and experience refer beyond their own 
presence, it is finally the lived body — as a manifestation 
of its thrown-ness against a historically given background, 
in conjunction with its lived commitment to the future 
in a projective running-ahead-of-itself — that collects 
sub-styles of comportment into larger styles and gives 
depth to experience and language. Where Derrida's 
background is endlessly differential and graphematic, 
Merleau-Ponty's is ultimately referential, gestural and 
somatic. This stance renders Merleau-Ponty neither 
nostalgic nor postmodern. 
For Merleau-Ponty, one gets a "maximal grip" (PP 374) 
on an experience because one's embodied, background style 
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situates it in a context of similar experience. This process 
happens before, and enables, reflective, subjective 
consciousness. The body and practical use just tend to 
disclose experience in the most meaningful way. And, to 
qualify this concept of en-owning or experiential 
"gripping," Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger also respect that 
ambiguity and referentiality are structurally necessary 
to en-owning. Contrasting modes of revealing, and other 
styles of comporting oneself, must offer themselves to 
experience if experience is to make sense. 
Stevens shows en-owning particularly well because, 
besides simply problematizing the issue of epiphany-directed 
contexts, he also keeps readers mindful that the process 
of en-owning owes its life to plurality. Stevens shows 
this point by juxtaposing, mixing and dis-owning contexts: 
every possible apocalypse to an extent becomes a eucalypse, 
every revealing, deepening and enclosing, depends upon 
a concomitant concealing, play and opening. 
One example of this movement between the points of 
context-qua-deepening and context understood as based upon 
transformation strikes readers in canto seven of the "It 
Must Be Abstract" section of Notes: 
"It feels good as it is without the giant, 
A thinker of the first idea. Perhaps 
The truth depends upon a walk around a lake, 
A composing as the body tires, a stop 
To see hepatica, a stop to watch 
A definition growing certain and 
A wait within that certainty, a rest 
In the swags of pine-trees bordering the lake. 
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Perhaps there are times of inherent excellence. 
As when the cock crows on the left and all 
Is well, incalculable balances. 
At which a kind of Swiss perfection comes 
And a familiar music of the machine 
Sets up its Schwarmerei,... 
(CP 386). 
In this passage, readers become aware that we are no 
longer in the realm of "the giant." We take a rest from 
the sober assembly of our serious "structures" (ibid.), 
and step outside the monolithic edifices that our quest 
to delimit the pluralistic "first idea" leads us to build. 
No longer concerned with the pursuit of one final "Truth," 
the truth now depends on, or is derivative of, the changing 
perspectives one gets from walking around a lake, an earthly 
symbol of temporary repose, not an "Ozymandian" repose 
set in stone for eternity. 
As we watch the hepatica grow, we sense that it is 
natural to see definition growing certain, but we also 
sense that it is the process of growing certain, not 
certainty itself, that the canto emphasizes. A sense of 
this passage deepens and grows clearer, just as the hepatica 
blooms, effortlessly. We rest, in a limited certainty, 
in a growing-certain, in the process of gathering and 
clearing that takes place within in a setting colored by 
the plurality of of other flora, the pine-trees. Even 
as we begin to consider the dangerously singular or 
metaphysical idea that there are times of inherent 
excellence, we still take our bearings from the natural 
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world and from our senses; we see the trees, we hear the 
cock crowing and we locate ourselves within this space. 
(Oliver Sacks suggests that we call our sense of locating 
ourselves, our "sixth sense," "proprio[-] ception.") The 
scene is still rich in variety, and its gathering into 
a coherent context does not yet diminish this richness. 
But, by the time we experience the expression, 
"incalculable balances," a rift enters thinking. 
"Incalculable" could refer to the priceless beauty of the 
surrounding natural scene, but the verb "to calculate," 
suggests instrumental thinking and calculation applied 
to nature. This menacing sense of calculation indeed 
resonates with the terms "Swiss perfection" "music of the 
machine" and "Schwarmerei," and bespeaks a certainty grown 
too certain. As elsewhere in Stevens "a quick answer 
modifies a question" (CP 470), so the word "machine" 
occasions an analepsis that casts backwards a new, in this 
case negative, connotation to the word "familiar." The 
sense of familiarity, at first a familiarity given by a 
scene that is at once wondrous in its complexity and 
meaningful in its resonance, now seems to indicate tedium: 
the all-too-familiar plot in which "...a man and a woman 
meet and love forthwith" (CP 386). 
So, a retreat from metaphysical notions of truth and 
certainty gives a sense of the diverse things of nature, 
only loosely connected by the body's "walking" and 
"composing." As the body waits, it watches, and gradually 
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a sense of subjectivity begins to emerge. However, it 
is not until the watcher reflects on "inherent [i.e. 
self-present] excellence" that this subjective consciousness 
separates from its surroundings. As the subjective autonomy 
of the viewer takes shape, balances become too mechanistic 
and the plurality of the environs is subsumed. 
As the stop on the walk begins to level-over the 
plurality of perceptions that vie for the viewer's attention 
within the natural setting, the poem shifts this scene, 
with the phrase "Swiss perfection," into the ironic key 
that in Stevens so typically follows a setting grown too 
singular, a definition grown too certain. Irony and 
self-parody suggest plurality and difference by undermining 
the over-seriousness of one situation through an implied 
reference to another, competing, context which the parodied 
party has overlooked. And Stevens' hyper-resonant moments 
are often broken off by irony. For Stevens, irony is never 
a device for gratuitous play, but, through irony, Stevens 
examines the competition between tendencies toward identity 
and tendencies toward difference: every movement toward 
a statement about reality, every attempt at seriousness 
that becomes too controlling begs for a different context 
that will relativize, not undermine it. 
Bevis too finds Stevens' irony to serve a deep purpose, 
and he takes a similar stance toward this passage, focusing 
on the oppressive regularity that arises once a definition 
has grown too certain. But Bevis takes from this reading 
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the conclusion that throughout this canto "nuances of tone 
and modulations of key take over and create the real 
subject; how the mind changes" (MW 257). What is missing 
from this account is that "mind," at least in this canto, 
is a derivative, not an originary phenomenon. Mind only 
separates from "world" as the context of the viewer becomes 
saturated. The issue of this canto is that meanings just 
tend to fill words and experiences and suggest themselves 
to the perceiver in every intelligible situation. It is 
only within and against the milieu of an overly determinate 
world that the mind of the Western subject arises. 
The Western notion of the mind, considered as that 
which reflects upon and re-presents its body and its 
environment, is a wholly conventional notion that took 
a long time in the making. The idea of mind, in fact, 
presupposes centuries of metaphysical thinking. It is 
not until "reality" can come to be considered as a whole, 
from a distance, that the meaning-giving subject becomes 
possible. When the metaphysical thinker names the sensory 
world, this world, in all its complexity, appears as a 
single, albeit complex, manifestation of one mode of Being. 
That which lets beings appear cannot itself partake in 
that which appears. So metaphysics, in keeping consistent 
with itself, attributes to Being super-sensory, eternal 
and fully present properties. 
In the West, the history of the essence of intelligible 
beings begins when everthing is considered a corrupted 
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reflection of the Platonic Eidos. Everything in being 
is then taken as Ergon, Aristotle's notion of the created 
work. Later, the being of "Man" and the being of the world 
appear as God-made substance; then "Man" becomes the 
interpreter of God's text. In the next epoch, ours, "Man" 
attains the position of a meaning-giving subject over 
against a world of objects. The "mental" activity of the 
"mind" is the name for the process by which the subject 
reflects upon its body and posits a world of objects. 
The distinction between subject and object compells 
Western Man to picture the world from outside and to order 
it. In the process of world-ordering, "Man" only encounters 
beings in reference to his projects. He thinks of time 
only as various modes of the present and he takes as real 
only the kind of presence that he can re-present in 
pre-established terms of productivity. 
In response to this mind/body, mind/world split, Michael 
E. Zimmerman remarks that there is a way out. Zimmerman 
finds that, according to both Heidegger and Mahayana 
Buddhism, "humans can learn to 'let beings be' only by 
gaining insight into the nothingness that pervades all 
things. Such insight...spontaneously leads to the 
overcoming of anthropocentrism and dualism" (CC 240). 
Since the birth of metaphysical thought that considers 
being exclusively in terms of presence, this "nothingness" 
has withdrawn itself. But, it is of that which is no-thing 
that Stevens, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger make us aware. 
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These three reawaken the sense of mystery that surrounds 
the appearance of words and things. The nothing is 
Heidegger's "clearing" and Merleau-Ponty*s background, 
as well as Stevens' "the nothing that is" (CP 9). The 
nothingness is the disclosive space or "region" within 
which beings appear. 
Zimmerman remarks further that this nothingness is 
Meister Eckhart's "Divine," and "The Divine cannot be 
regarded as a super entity existing somewhere else, but 
instead constitutes the unconditioned openness or emptiness 
in which all things appear" (CC 241). What co-appears 
with every appearance, that which "traces" itself in 
Derrida's language, is the phenomenon of a background that 
escapes representation. So Bevis' Buddhist methodology 
itself, along with the methodology that Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty practice, require that readers not take the 
issue of mind for granted in Stevens. 
Another non-cognitive passage from Stevens confirms 
the non-primordiality of mind. In section two, canto five, 
the poem takes us to the island in "sky-wide water." Here, 
we are told: 
"...A few limes remained. 
Where his house had fallen, three scraggy trees weighted 
With garbled green. These were the planter's turquoise 
And his orange blotches, these were his zero green, 
A green baked greener in the greenest sun" 
(CP 393). 
Although the poet mentions a viewing subject, the 
planter is now long dead, and the poem gives a sense that 
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the growing greening of everything, the increasing 
pervasiveness of green, from "garbled" to all-pervasive, 
almost takes place without any human doing or seeing at 
all. The subjectivity in this passage appears as an absence 
only. In this passage, and throughout "An Ordinary Evening 
in New Haven," we readers find ourselves involved in a 
pattern; we are led to think that without the mediation 
of a subjective interpretation, we will be able to return 
to a view of the thing in itself, "without trope or 
deviation" (CP 471). And this seems to be the case at 
first. Later, however, we find that nothing, not even 
the primal moment, appears without figuration, trope and 
deviation. 
Stevens brings us to the point of the supposed genesis 
of figuration when he shows us Adam and Eve. Setting the 
scene, the poem indicates that "in the earth itself they 
found a green..." (383). This, we assume to be a moment 
without precedent, a place where words exhaust the essence 
of the things of which they speak. No sooner do we find 
ourselves with the inhabitants of Eden, though, then we 
are told they are "the inhabitants of a very varnished 
green." (ibid.). Adam, even if he acts not as the founder 
of subjectivity, anticipates the founder of subjectivity: 
Descartes. There is no subjectivity prior to Adam, "the 
father of Descartes," and yet everything Adam encounters 
appears to him already interpreted, as it were, self-lessly, 
or, better, prerefelectively: prior to the emergence of 
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a self. 
On the desert isle, the symbol for seclusion, the only 
inhabitant mentioned is dead, and we see the island only 
from a narrative perspective. But, no sooner do we 
appreciate the unmediated character of the scene than the 
scene changes. Not just objects in the scene change, 
but the entire setting of the scene literally (in so far 
as that term applies) "takes on a whole new light." 
But it would be wrong to take from this passage only 
the fact that even when we supposedly come across the 
unmediated thing, it continues to refigure itself. Rather, 
what is of note here is the fact that experience orders 
itself into ever-deepening contexts without any 
consideration of the subject. It is only when the subject 
tries to "impose" itself, to continually gather and to 
enforce already over-resonant contexts, that the flexibility 
of these contexts withdraws. 
Stevens discloses Ereignis in giving instances where 
words, meanings, figures of speech and events show up in 
new modes that are proper to them. Yet he also shows 
growing contextual resonance that dissolves itself before 
becoming singular, and this keeps readers mindful that 
things must be able to appear as relativized, or under 
different aspects, to have meaning. The poem also portrays 
subjectivity emerging, dominating and then dissolving so 
that embodied, pre-subjectivity holds sway over meaning-
formation. And the poem provides instances of futile 
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attempts to strip away all perceptual uncertainty and 
accidents to return to the substance of reality. 
Before moving on to see the other ways in which Stevens 
discloses disclosing, we might take one more example of 
the way that Stevens addresses resonance, subjectivity 
and referentiality. The "Canon Aspirin section of "Notes" 
provides such an address: 
"When at long midnight the Canon came to sleep 
And normal things had yawned themselves away. 
The nothingness was a nakedness, a point. 
Beyond which fact could not progress as fact. 
Thereon the learning of the man conceived 
Once more night's pale illuminations, gold 
Beneath, far underneath, the surface of 
His eye and audible in the mountain of 
His ear, the very material of his mind. 
So that he was the ascending wings he saw 
And moved on them in orbits' outer stars 
Descending to the children's bed, on which 
They lay. Forth then with huge pathetic force 
Straight to the crown of night he flew. 
The nothingness was a nakedness, a point 
Beyond which thought could not progress as thought. 
He had to choose. But it was not a choice 
Between excluding things. It was not a choice 
Between but of. He chose to include the things 
That in each other are included, the whole. 
The complicate, the amassing harmony" (CP 403). 
One of the first things that might come to mind reading 
this section is Heidegger's restatement of the fundamental 
question of metaphysics: "why is there something rather 
than nothing?" (IM 4). What this question implies is that 
there is no way to explain everything as though from 
without, because to do so involves an unavoidable 
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scale-problem. To explain everything in existence, one 
must always have recourse to something that already exists 
within the everything one seeks to explain. Metaphysics 
moves into the realm of nothingness that lies outside of 
everything that is, and, here "fact cannot progress as 
fact" and "thought cannot progress as thought." The irony 
of ironies is that once one has the view from nowhere, 
or in other words, once one has full clarity and presence 
to oneself, one has no terms in which to explain it. 
The Canon Aspirin aspires toward full harmony, toward 
seeing everything from without: "the things/ That in each 
other are included" are all things. Every thing makes 
sense only in reference to everything else. From a point 
outside this co-inclusivity there exists no thing else 
to be included. From his standpoint, as the master of 
being, the Canon appreciates no sense of scale. He sees 
children and stars together, indiscernible from each other, 
and his mind conceives stars from above. From this point 
the complicated, difficult and variegated nature of things 
is leveled-over, named solely "the whole,/ The complicate." 
But it appears that the Canon is successful in his 
project of reaching non-referential perception and complete 
identity. Or so it appears. In the next canto, we see 
this aspiration of the Canon's come crashing down on itself, 
and we realize that the dream of an all-amassing harmony 
threatens perception, selfhood and the notion of harmony, 
or resonance, itself; 
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"He imposes orders as he thinks of them. 
As the fox and snake do.... 
...But to impose is not 
To discover. To discover an order as of 
A season, to discover summer and know it. 
To discover winter and know it well, to find. 
Not to impose, not to have reasoned at all. 
Out of nothing to have come upon major weather, 
It is possible, possible, possible. It must 
Be possible. It must be that in time 
The real will from its crude compoundings come. 
Seeming at first a beast disgorged, unlike. 
Warmed by a desperate milk. To find the real. 
To be stripped of every fiction except one. 
The fiction of an absolute — Angel, 
Be silent in your luminous cloud and hear 
The luminous melody of proper sound" (CP 404). 
The quest for pure subjectivity is a fool's self-
defeating errand. But, to act as object and avoid one's 
commitment to the world is likewise impossible. By the 
point at which the poet suggests that to discover is "not 
to have reasoned at all" (ibid.), readers are clued in 
that the passive waiting for an apocalyptic revelation 
and the emergence of the real from its "crude compoundings" 
is likewise futile, as it relegates the watcher to the 
position of someone who only lives in the temporal dimension 
of the possible. 
The Canon stands outside of the world and outside the 
harmony and perceives it all at once. He hears the joining 
of every being into one thing and this amounts to not 
hearing at all. He is not himself joined to this joining 
process. The perception of harmony depends upon one's 
being joined with it over time. As Merleau-Ponty notices 
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in a statement about language that could apply with equal 
power to all forms of sensory perception, "It is far less 
a table of statements which satisfy well-formed thoughts 
than a swarm of gestures all occupied with differentiating 
themselves from one another and blending again" (PW 115). 
The Canon cannot perceive differentiation, but only 
blending, since he perceives everything as belonging to 
only one amassing harmony. The Canon's abs-traction 
trivializes the complex and concrete process of joining 
and sundering, reifying it as merely "the complicate," 
and picturing it from afar. The desire for "The fiction 
of an absolute," if that fiction involves finding "the 
real" as a whole and from outside, prompts the poet to 
descend back into the mysterious, differentiated world 
of the everyday and to witness proper sound as comprised 
of various melodies that escape the confines of one single, 
amassing harmony. 
Whether it is the Canon Aspirin, the Angel, or the 
reader who has moved to the position of the extraworldly, 
is not important. In canto seven, the extra-worldly subject 
"imposes orders as he thinks of them." Thinking and being 
collapse into an identity for the pure, disembodied subject. 
From this position, as canto eight tells its readers, one 
is godlike in one's ability to "serenely gaze at the violent 
abyss." But, from this position one appreciates no 
otherness or mystery: 
"These external regions, what do we fill them with 
Except reflections, the escapades of death. 
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Cinderella fulfilling herself beneath the roof?" 
(CP 405) 
The angel, having descended and then been conflated 
with the poet's imagination, now sees the world from a 
position within it and speaks of a "we" that joins the 
poet's voice to the voices of others. But, though located 
within the world, the poet's being retains its angelic 
detachment and the solipsistic poet sees the world not 
in its own terms but as "reflections." The fact that life 
is vapid for the detached subject is driven home by the 
lonely, even onanistic image of "Cinderella fulfilling 
herself." 
At the point in which the subject comes to actuality 
and finds no glory in dominating the world, this context 
breaks off. Several lines later, a new context arises 
in which the implied character becomes an object, alive 
only in its awaiting the future. But, between the points 
of subjectivity and objectivity, between the points of 
actuality and potentiality, the poem does find the kind 
of resonance that gives abiding relevance. As both 
actuality and potential, subject and object, one "discovers 
an order" and "knows it well." One is familiar in a world 
where one neither imposes nor awaits reality, but allows 
interpretations to emerge. Neither the fully subjective, 
nor the fully objective contexts allow for the open-
endedness required for general sense-making, and each 
dissolves. 
In the dissolution of these contexts is revealed the 
80 
referentiality of experience. Stevens shows the role of 
the poem as a commentary on the way that the poem, in fact 
sense itself, works. He takes nothing for granted, but 
takes from philosophy the issues of the self, of in-itself 
reality, and the referential play of figuration that 
comprises reality and questions them as though for the 
first time. In this questioning, he asks what is required 
for the illusion of a final reality, a self and 
non-referential presence, and he finds the process that 
governs the process of sense-making in life and in the 
poem. 
But if, as has been suggested, all poetic language 
moves by the gathering giving of Ereignis, how could Stevens 
be unique in showing this gathering? Stevens not only 
shows this force at work and the way that its working 
implies a simultaneous unworking, he also explicitly 
discusses the nature of poetry and implicitly ties poeisis 
to Ereignis. The poem lets those who experience it "share,/ 
For a moment, the first idea." And this "idea" proves 
itself structured by en-owning. Although the first idea 
opens up the poem and makes sense of each of its thirty 
cantos by bringing them to co-appear as various forms of 
inquiry into the way ideation works, this first idea is 
characterized by its ambiguous ontological status, and 
it seems to serve a unifying function while it lets each 
canto appear in a different light. 
Stevens' use of metaphor, or generally speaking, 
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figurative language, bolsters the false but necessary 
conviction that the poem can finally gain access to 
reality. In the traditional sense, metaphor seems to be 
a fall from propriety, while it simultaneously serves an 
eschatological function, promising the return to a divine 
realm where there is no more metaphor, to a language beyond 
figuration. Traditional discussions of metaphor usually 
play themselves out in accordance within the logic of the 
sensible/intelligible and the natural/historical 
oppositions. This tradition tells us that the sensible 
world is obscured by the use of metaphor which, while 
rendering experience more intelligible, also removes its 
immediacy. 
Literary and philosophical traditions find that 
metaphors are embedded in a network of historical 
interpretations, and this fact leads to speculation that 
the substance of language and experience gets covered over 
by accidental associations. On the traditional account, 
if we could get over metaphor, we could get beyond history 
and embodied experience to speak again the pure language 
of nature. 
For Derrida, the oppositions that prioritize proper 
language are themselves metaphorical and historically 
situated. Traditional, that is metaphysical, philosophy 
seeks a position outside of the ever-turning "theatre of 
trope," and thus hopes to achieve mastery over language. 
But even philosophy's own notion that it "tropes" toward 
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the truth and closes precisely with its meaning brings 
the language of philosophy back into the ceaseless play 
of figuration that it would escape. It can be said that, 
for the Western tradition, the "good" metaphor provides 
a "vehicle" that gives a context in which the sense of 
its "tenor" is discovered. But "good" metaphors actually 
change the context in which the tenor appears. For 
postmodern critique, then, language is irreducibly 
metaphorical and metaphors change the reality they seem 
to discover. 
For Merleau-Ponty, similarly, there is no experience 
or meaning outside of embodied, historical being-in-the-
world. Although a person might be said to have what 
Merleau-Ponty calls a "style," there is no literal, 
substantive, meaning-giving "self" to which metaphors might 
lead back, nor from which they are generated, because the 
term "mind" itself belongs to the realm of the figurative 
or the interpretive. As Merleau-Ponty points out, the 
notion of self-present consciousness ignores the essentially 
evasive or self-fleeing character of consciousness. In 
Merleau-Ponty's terms, figuration itself would be a figure 
for the process that the prereflective background performs. 
It is only in terms of this background that similarities 
suggest themselves and that other connections remain 
unannounced. This background re-figures itself in new 
metaphors, and, thus re-figured, the background foregrounds 
previously unthought connections. The background, like 
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the process of figuration, gives the self, objects and 
linguistic acts as identical with themselves on the basis 
of difference from themselves. 
According to Joseph Kronick, "The first idea always 
takes us back to the weather, a residue of figuration that 
cannot be erased" (WSJ 96). So the weather is a metaphor 
for the uncertainty that haunts meaning. Every time we 
think we have a clear view of a landscape, or every time 
an image appears in the clouds, it turns out that the 
weather changes, giving a new image to the cloud, or a 
new color to the landscape. The sun, too, Kronick points 
out, is never seen in itself, but always seen in its 
colorations of objects. 
To this account, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger would 
respond, presumably, by commenting that it is correct, 
but incomplete. It is precisely by virtue of the fact 
that houses change color in different light and that Phoebus 
once appeared as the "gold flourisher" and again as 
slumbering "in autumn umber" that the sun and the things 
we experience in a changing light come to acquire such 
richness and dimension. 
Merleau-Ponty and Derrida agree, there is no "true," 
that is, unchanging, color to anything in experience. 
As Merleau-Ponty points out, when we see a red object, 
it makes no sense, or at most it makes a vapid kind of 
sense, to describe it scientifically as "red number 
seventeen." We always see colors under their aspects; 
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we see the "wooly red of the carpet" or the sharp metallic 
red of the fire engine. The fact that we can never have 
an unmediated experience of the thing makes it possible, 
rather than disingenuous, to claim we have a grip on it. 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty would say that metaphor does 
transform the thing, but this transformation, in most cases, 
leads to another instance of resonance. 
And, speaking of the weather, again we see in the poem 
that the weather does constantly transform itself and that 
which it lets appear under its own aspect, but what is 
important is that, throughout the poem, in the various 
accounts of its transformation, the weather acquires an 
ever-greater, though never full, significance. As Stevens 
says, "the first idea becomes/ The hermit in a poet's 
metaphors" (381). Metaphor always renames experience, 
and it never gets at an extra-metaphorical reality. But, 
in renaming experience, metaphor gives it a new and richer 
sense. There are cases where new metaphors change the 
entire background in which they initially made sense, 
anomalies that change the paradigm, but deconstruction 
takes these cases as the rule, not as the gestalt- and 
paradigm-shifting exception. 
To say, "love is a rose" is just plain boring. To 
say "love is a beachball" is new, but still presupposes 
that there is a real, natural category called "love." 
This presupposition flourishes against a Christian and 
Platonic background, replete with social practices for 
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being in love. But, there is nothing in Heidegger or 
Merleau-Ponty, or Stevens for that matter, that assumes 
there is such a natural kind. The poem gives kinship 
between and a "kindred kind" to things. There is a chance 
that our background, presented by enough challenges from 
within, might completely change and render completely 
unfamiliar the phenomenon of love, and its metaphors, as 
we know them. Such changes, however, though necessary, 
and though it is necessary that they always be possible, 
seem a component of, not a challenge to, the process of 
Ereignis. To Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, metaphor is 
not the space of constant transformation, but the hermitage 
of poetic en-owning. 
Shifts in sense give greater resonance to contexts 
and can change them altogether. But deconstruction tells 
us that this statement takes the notion of a context for 
granted. Derrida challenges the notion of a self-sufficient 
context, as do Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Stevens. But 
for this latter group, just as contexts color the words 
that appear within them, and dissolve when everything within 
has become the same color, so words spoken in a play, a 
poem, or in different contexts over time, bring the context 
into its own, never bringing it to self-sufficiency. 
Changes of context and anomalies within contexts remain 
important for Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Stevens, but 
this gives us insufficient reason to emphasize 
transformation and the anomalous as such. Heideggerians 
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concede to Derrida that no context is complete and that 
no word belongs solely to one context. Both value the 
flexibility of the meaning of words and the flexibility 
of contexts. But for Derrida, this flexibility seems 
important in itself, where for Heidegger this flexibility 
leads to the increased resonance of words. As Charles 
Spinosa comments, "when we speak, we use [unfamiliar] terms 
as we have heard others use them in various contexts with 
the hope, each time, of coming to a better understanding 
of the phenomenon the words pick out and why it is an 
important one" (HR 287). Spinosa remarks that Ereignis 
lets us "develop a richer understanding of a practice we 
are already involved in" (ibid.). In terms Merleau-Ponty 
would use, we may read "getting a better grip on the 
phenomenon" for "coming to a better understanding" and 
for Stevens we may read, "life's nonsense pierces us with 
strange relation." 
When he writes about context, Derrida's "writerly" 
approach to meaning involves his elaboration of that force 
which structures writing and Differance: "Iterability." 
In Signature event context, Derrida indicates that we 
never experience a stable, "fully saturated" context. 
According to Derrida, no context can ever give one enough 
to determine meaning completely. This is why Derrida asks, 
rhetorically: 
"Are the pre-requisites of a context ever absolutely 
determinable? Fundamentally, this is the most general 
question I would like to attempt to elaborate. Is 
there a rigorous and scientific concept of the context?" 
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He will answer this question at length by saying that 
if there could be such a thing as a pure context and a 
word could be limited to only several meanings, then 
language could not work at all (MP 310). Throughout part 
one of SEC, Derrida demonstrates, "why a context is never 
absolutely determinable, or rather in what way its 
determination is never certain or saturated" (ibid.). 
Language depends for its very life upon the structural 
insufficiency of contexts. Derrida shows that the driving 
force in language, iterability, makes communication possible 
and a pure or complete context impossible. It is not just 
an inconvenient fact about contexts that they can never 
be homogenous. Rather, for any word, experience or thing 
to make sense and appear as identifiable, it must remain 
intercontextual, or capable of moving between one context 
and another. Words and experiences must have something 
ab-sent or abstractible about them that lets one recognize 
them again, elsewhere and outside the present moment. 
The signifier "floats," untethered to any particular 
signified or situation. The fact that the same word can 
appear in limitless contexts gives it meaning and 
intelligibility. 
And contexts themselves could not give meaning at all 
if they contained no "residue" of other contexts. What's 
more, not only do contexts depend for their intelligibility 
upon other contexts, but they necessarily remain liable 
to destabilization from within. Neither one context nor 
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a speaker's intention can control what words will mean 
within that context. A speaker's words can change the 
speaker's intention as well as the context in which it 
appeared. This is how not only the written sign, but every 
sign gets "proffered in the absence of the addressee" (315), 
and in the absence of its sender or producer as well. 
I might make a comment within one context and, by uttering 
it, change that context. A speaker's words, once spoken, 
must be able to mean something radically other than either 
the speaker's previous context or what they wanted to say 
"dictated." 
In a word, words must be iterable, and contexts always 
shifting, for any meaning to be communicated at all. 
Derrida follows the etymology of the "iter" to the Sanskrit 
"itara," which simply means "other." Words must be able 
to mean something other than the intention which precedes 
them and they depend for their sense upon other words. 
And the signifier must be other than the signified. 
Iterability means that a word must be able to function 
in a non-identical context to mean anything. Similarly, 
a context can never fully determine meaning because it 
is itself, of necessity, always incomplete, always referring 
to other contexts and itself changing. Since "a written 
sign carries with it a force of breaking with its context, 
that is, the set of presences which organize the moment 
of its production" (317), and this factor marks writing, 
writing gives the possibility of speech. 
89 
Certain of Stevens' stanzas seem to bear out this 
understanding of language as based upon indeterminacy and 
transformation; 
"...The casual is not 
Enough. The freshness of transformation is 
The freshness of a world. It is our own. 
It is ourselves, the freshness of ourselves" 
(398). 
But even here, in the midst of his praise of 
transformation, Stevens notices that transformation is 
our own and is the condition of our self-hood. The poem 
and transformations of the everyday sense of things refresh 
our understandings of who we are, and even change who we 
are. But these changes do not always sunder us from 
ourselves. Most often, transformation brings us into a 
new, abiding mode of revealing that discloses and unites 
many aspects of our style of daily life. 
And Stevens answers the praise of transformation 
himself: 
"The partaker partakes of that which changes him. 
The child that touches takes character from the thing. 
The body, it touches. The captain and his men 
Are one and the sailor and the sea are one" (392). 
The intertextuality of partaker and that of which he 
partakes does not necessarily take him out of his style 
of life, but that which changes him becomes part of his 
way of disclosing the world. In like manner, the child 
is not a "character," in the sense of a written sign that 
keeps escaping the contexts that would hold it, but the 
child incorporates a character or style from the things 
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and bodies that it relates to in the world. 
By now it should seem clearer that, although iterability 
is a force necessary to language, it is by no means a force 
sufficient to that which is needed to drive language. 
We have seen Heidegger's deepest non- or pre-metaphysical 
term Ereignis, working on the personal and the poetic 
levels, this focusing tendency underwrites language, or 
makes all linguistic and perceptual acts possible. As 
has been shown, en-owning means the tendency of practices 
to gather together into modes of revealing things and 
other people. This is how things, practices and contexts 
"come into their own" and we ourselves "own up" to who 
we are without necessarily achieving a fully integrated 
identity. 
When Stevens tells us "there was a myth before the 
myth began," (383) he seems to mean that there is a tendency 
in linguistic gathering that facilitates myth-making. 
This "muddy source" is unclear and yet "articulate." 
In light of all the previous joining-together that Stevens 
has shown, though never demanding full clarity, it seems 
at least possible that here the meaning of "articulate" 
is that of something joined together. Considering the 
fact that practices tend to join together in order to reveal 
things and people in en-owning, one might say that this 
articulation is the language-like source of myth. If one 
wanted a religious equivalent for Stevens' expression, 
one could call "Notes" polytheistic: The poem entertains 
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a series of different takes on "final" reality without 
offering one final story, and each approach holds sway 
and gives sense in a limited capacity. 
The gathering, articulating power of en-owning gives 
language. But Ereignis does not ground or precede language, 
because it is itself articulating, language-giving and 
not extra-linguistic in form. Speech and writing, myth 
and poem are our co-responding to this process. For 
Derrida, the gathering together of all styles into a single 
style of course involves the repression of iterability. 
But it also stultifies Ereignis. If all styles were leveled 
into one homogenous style, no genuine resonance could take 
place at all. Ereignis necessarily occurs across styles. 
For Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, embodied human 
experience and practices, and not the play of signifiers, 
is the final court of appeals in every meaningful 
experience. The body as the only given, gives sense. 
In this sense, the body with its gestures and its voice, 
is the phone semantike, the significant voice, or the voice 
that gives signification. So, although liable to charges 
of "phonocentrism," or somato-centrism, Merleau-Ponty, 
Heidegger and Stevens never move into logocentrism. Lived 
experience grounds and contextualizes, while opening up, 
the play of figuration. 
What does "Notes" do? Before addressing and 
problematizing issues of self and other, before meditating 
on consciousness, before showing "displacements" and the 
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differential play of significations, before fragmenting 
and before addressing itself to Romanticism, Stevens' poem 
discloses en-owning as the moving force in experience and 
language. To disclose the condition of disclosure, to 
disclose disclosing, forecloses the possibility of any 
identity, be it personal, cultural, experiential, or 
linguistic, without discounting meaningful events in 
language and experience. Sounds, words, tropes, contexts, 
poems, tales, fictions, myths, people, styles and perception 
all move according to the law of the "plainest and most 
gentle" force behind language: en-owning. The poem ends, 
"...flicked by feeling, in a gildered street, 
I call you by name, my green, my fluent mundo. 
You will have stopped revolving except in crystal" 
(CP 407). 
Here the poem puts an end to the difficult pattern 
of being what it is not, and of not being what it is. 
What the poet calls by name, what may now bear a name, 
is the world; though the world is fluent, always in flux, 
and fluent in different languages. Does this naming not 
define, fix and stop the world? The world seems to have 
stopped revolving, but now, as a crystal ballroom ball, 
it casts even more "new light." At this point in the poem, 
readers have a richer, more resonant sense of fluency, 
of revolving and of the poem than ever before. 
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